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Part 1 of the paper reviews recent trends in fossil fuel use and associated externalities. It also 
argues that the recent run-up in international oil prices reflects growing concerns about supply 
constraints associated with declining spare capacity in OPEC, refining bottlenecks, and 
geopolitical uncertainties rather than growing incremental use of oil by China and India. 
Part 2 compares two business as usual scenarios with a set of alternate scenarios based on 
policy interventions on the demand for or supply of energy and different assumptions about 
rigidities in domestic and international energy markets. The results suggest that energy 
externalities are likely to worsen significantly if there is no shift in China’s and India's energy 
strategies. High energy demand from China and India could constrain some developing countries’ 
growth via higher prices on international energy markets, but for others the ‘growth retarding’ 
effects of higher energy prices are partially or fully offset by the ‘growth stimulating’ effects of 
the larger markets in China and India. Given that there are many inefficiencies in the energy 
system in both China and India, there is an opportunity to reduce energy growth without 
adversely affecting GDP growth. The cost of a decarbonizing energy strategy will be higher for 
China and India than a fossil fuel based strategy, but the net present value of delaying the shift 
will be higher than acting now. The less fossil fuel dependent alternative strategies provide 
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Sustainability issues do not normally manifest themselves for decades because 
either population growth rates or per capita income growth rates are relatively slow. But 
such issues become difficult to ignore when growth rates are not slow – as in China in a 
last two decades. China's rapid transformation from an agricultural based economy to the 
manufacturing workshop has been accompanied by a corresponding change in the spatial 
concentration and location of the population from relatively low density rural areas to 
very high density urban areas. This transformation is having a significant impact on the 
quantity and quality of natural resources available as inputs into the production process 
and consumption, as well as the ability of the environment to absorb the waste 
byproducts deposited in the air, water, and soil. The recent acceleration of growth in 
India is beginning to generate similar problems. 
Development strategies targeting high growth in gross domestic product (GDP), 
by relying on low-cost, low efficiency, and highly polluting technology are likely to put 
pressure on available natural resources and sinks
1   over time. A major one-time 
opportunity is emerging in Asia to shift efficiently to a path that does not lock-in 
inefficient resource use. This opportunity arises from the massive investments expected in 
the next 50 years (on the order of trillions of dollars) to accommodate the urbanization of 
the population (and the simultaneous reduction of poverty and the backlog of service 
provision) (World Bank, 2003). 
Addressing emerging domestic and local problems will be the primary national 
motivation for taking action. However, there is also likely to be an international 
dimension to the problem if externalities are generated on international resources and 
sinks as needs grow beyond their domestic counterparts. This will generate costs for other 
countries, and may even provoke conflict, if domestic and international institutions for 
collective action do not emerge in a timely manner
2. 
Although this statement of the interaction between growth and natural resources 
applies to a wide range of natural resources and asset management issues in China and 
India, this paper focuses exclusively on the issue of managing and meeting energy needs 
for growth so as to minimize negative consequences for health, and the environment – 
locally and globally. 
The objective of this paper is to shed some light on the following set of issues: 
•  What is likely to be the demand for energy –  particularly oil and coal –  under a 
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario in China and India in 2020 and up to 2050? 
                                                 
1 Sinks absorb pollution and waste. 
2 Developing the institutions to identify and enforce appropriate criteria (that take into account the scale and 
distribution of externalities, as well as the use of option values) for these investments will determine whether the 
cumulative investment program is welfare enhancing internally or not, due to path dependency and the potential for 
lock-in to inefficient paths. However, the topic of institutional development is not covered in this paper.    3
•  What are likely to be the associated levels of emissions that could have damaging 
consequences at the local level (such as particulate matter), regional level (such as 
ozone, sulfur and acid rain), and global level (CO2 in particular)? 
•  What domestic interventions in the development of the energy producing and energy 
using sectors might make a significant difference in the energy path relative to a 
business as usual scenario? 
  In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the paper is organized in two parts. 
Part 1 provides a review of the problems associated with the recent trends in overall 
energy use and its composition in China and India, with some discussion of the 
associated trends in local and global emissions. This section also includes a brief 
discussion of the extent to which energy use in China and India has affected the recent 
run-up in international energy prices. 
The crux of the story in this part is that high growth in the manufacturing sector and 
in the electricity producing sector in both countries, but particularly in China, is fueling 
rapid growth in fossil fuel energy use –  primarily coal. Even though India is more 
diversified in energy sources because of its greater reliance on traditional biomass, both 
countries have limited, cheap domestic energy resources for electricity generation other 
than coal in the near future. The heavy reliance on coal is associated with the expansion 
of various types of local pollutants (such as suspended particulate matter, sulfur/SO2, 
etc.) contributing to health problems (with impacts particularly in cities), and ozone and 
acid rain (with impacts particularly in rural areas). Attempts to reduce local emissions in 
China by curtailing coal production and consumption had some success for a few years in 
the late 1990s without restricting the growth of GDP
3. But this decoupling could not be 
sustained because high growth in the economy was generating power shortages and other 
dislocations, necessitating the resumption of coal use even if it was inefficiently 
produced. 
The industrial policy decision to support motorization (i.e., greater dependence on 
automobiles and road transport) because of its multiple linkages to other sectors, has 
resulted in both countries experiencing a surge in the demand for oil (gasoline, diesel and 
other oil products). This and the dramatic growth in aviation in both countries have 
resulted in a rapid growth in oil imports with implications for the balance of payments 
and energy security. The recent rise in global oil prices is partially a result of the growth 
in energy use in China and India. Together the two of them account for 40 to 50 percent 
of the increase in the global use of oil since 2001, even though they only account for 9–
10 percent of aggregate global use of oil. However, this growth in oil use in China and 
India has been partially offset by the deceleration or drop in oil use in countries 
traditionally dependent on oil. As a result, aggregate global use of oil has not grown 
substantially in the last few years relative to the previous few years. But, because of the 
tightening of oil supplies (due to the declining spare capacity in Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), insufficient investment in exploration and 
refining capacity, and to geo-political problems) the inventory model of price forecasting 
no longer works. In fact, international prices are growing far faster than can be explained 
                                                 
3 Output or GDP is not an ideal measure of welfare, but it is an indicator most commonly focused on by policy makers.   4
by demand increases alone, indicating the presence of supply constraints and increased 
uncertainty. 
Part 2 describes
4 a couple of scenarios for the trajectory of energy and emissions 
in China and India up to 2050. The reference case is designated as a business as usual 
scenario (BAU) with a high growth variant (BAU-H). These are compared with a set of 
alternate scenarios (ALT) based on interventions on the demand and supply side of 
energy use which result in substantially more energy efficiency and lower global and 
local emissions relative to the BAU cases. The underlying assumptions of these scenarios 
are provided as well as their implications for global energy markets (including energy 
prices) and global emissions under different assumptions on the presence or absence of 
rigidities/frictions in energy markets. Potential feedback effects on national and global 
GDP growth rates are also discussed briefly. This section also includes some rough 
estimates of the investment requirements of the different scenarios and implications for 
additional financing if growth constraints are to be avoided. 
The crux of the story is that to improve the welfare of their citizens and generate a 
steady stream of employment to accommodate the growing labor force, both China and 
India will have to maintain high GDP growth rates for many decades. With the 
demographic shift of the population to urban areas and the growing per capita income of 
the urban population, the demand for electricity will be increasing rapidly. At present, the 
most abundant and cheapest domestic fuel source for electricity production in both China 
and India is coal. There will also be a growing demand for mobility in both countries 
which is likely to be increasingly satisfied through growing road and air traffic –  both 
heavy consumers of oil. 
Thus, the two business as usual scenarios (BAU) presuppose heavy reliance on fossil 
fuels for the next couple of decades with adverse consequences for local emissions 
(suspended particulates, sulfur, ozone, etc.), as well as global emissions (greenhouse 
gases—particularly CO2). The reference BAU scenario assumes annual growth rates of 
6.5–7.5 percent in China and 5–6 percent scenarios in India over the next decade or two 
with both rates tapering to 3-4 percent a year by 2050. The high growth rate scenarios 
(7.5–9 percent per annum in China and 7–8 percent per annum in India) are based on 
recent performance and extrapolation of government assumptions for upcoming five-year 
plans. These BAU scenarios will put pressure on international energy markets—
particularly if there are rigidities in the rate at which supply can expand (because of 
institutional and logistical difficulties in developing coal in India and China, and/or 
international oil market uncertainties regarding the returns to investment—for example in 
oil refineries etc. — as well as, reliance on high-cost alternate sources for oil—such as tar 
sands, etc.). The higher world energy prices will have repercussions on China and India 
resulting in some reallocation of investment away from higher productivity non-energy 
sectors and the growth of less energy intensive activities. The impact of higher world 
energy prices on other parts of the world will be mixed. Growth rates will be adversely 
affected by higher prices, but these will be partially or fully offset by growing exports to 
the larger markets in rapidly growing China and India – particularly in the high growth 
rate scenarios. 
                                                 
4 Based on background work commissioned to simulate and analyze selected scenarios.   5
The alternate, policy-based scenarios (ALT) are designed to explore the extent of two 
potential decouplings. First, decoupling energy growth from GDP growth through a 
combination of increased energy efficiency and structural shifts away from energy-
intensive manufacturing. Second, decoupling emissions growth from energy growth 
through fuel switching from coal to gas (or clean coal), or from fossil fuels to nuclear 
energy or renewables. Traditionally, the presumption is that the higher cost of investment 
in alternatives to fossil fuels will be prohibitive and therefore best delayed until 
technological innovations reduce their costs to avoid adversely affecting GDP growth 
rates. The cumulative financial cost reducing benefit of this delayed investment, however, 
may be offset by the increased cumulative emissions cost associated with prolonged 
reliance on fossil fuels. In the IMACLIM-R model used for the simulations in this paper, 
“learning by doing” is built-in; therefore earlier investments in novel technologies will 
accelerate the rate at which one moves down the cost curve thereby reducing the 
aggregate financial burden. In the reference case, as well as scenarios with rigidities in 
adjustment in global (local) energy markets, some external financing becomes necessary 
if growth rates are not to be adversely affected in China and India. However, in the high 
growth rate scenario, enough savings are generated (particularly in China, less so in 
India) to potentially self finance a larger part of the higher cost of investment in energy 
efficiency and the shift away from carbon based fuels.   6
PART 1 – The Level and Composition of Energy Use and Emissions in 
China and India 
For many purposes (such as, to analyze the energy intensity of an economy and so 
forth), it is sufficient to focus on the level of aggregate energy use. Local and global 
emissions from energy use, however, are sensitive to the composition of energy used 
(different fuels) and not simply to its level. 
 
1.1 Emerging Concerns 
There are many issues involved in managing energy supply and demand in China 
and India. However, a few broad concerns are emerging that are of particular interest.
5 
 
A. Demand for Fossil Fuel Energy Is Exceeding Domestic Supply Capabilities 
At the aggregate level China and India currently consume about 12 and 5 percent 
of the world’s energy, respectively. In terms of composition, China's consumption of coal 
is slightly less than its own production of coal – the balance being exported (table 1). On 
the other hand, China's consumption of petroleum is increasingly larger than its 
production—the balance being imported. For most other fuels, domestic consumption and 
production are still roughly in balance. India’s domestic production of coal and oil 
satisfies an even smaller part of its consumption and the imbalance is growing—
particularly in oil (table 1).
6 Both countries produce gas, but gas consumption does not 
yet account for a significant share of energy use. 
 
Table 1: Energy Balance in China and India (1980-2003) 








and Waste  Nuclear Total
China 1980 316 107 12 5 180 0 620 313 89 12 5 180 0 599
1985 405 130 13 8 189 0 744 401 93 13 8 189 0 704
1990 545 136 16 11 200 0 908 535 110 16 11 200 0 872
1995 691 149 19 16 206 3 1084 673 158 19 16 206 3 1075
2000 698 151 28 19 214 4 1115 664 222 26 19 214 4 1149
2003 917 169 36 24 219 11 1377 862 270 35 24 219 11 1422
India 1980 50 11 1 4 148 1 215 53 34 1 4 148 1 241
1985 71 31 4 4 162 1 274 76 48 4 4 162 1 296
1990 97 35 10 6 176 2 326 104 63 10 6 176 2 360
1995 124 39 17 6 189 2 377 134 84 17 6 189 2 432
2000 143 37 21 6 202 4 414 159 114 21 6 202 4 506
2003 157 39 23 6 211 5 441 173 124 23 6 211 5 542
Production and Stock Change (Mtoe) Consumption (Mtoe)
 
Source: IEA (2005a). 
                                                 
5 
This review of problems is based primarily on secondary source literature. In the past few  years, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) in Europe, the U.S. Department of Energy, and others (such as the Asia Pacific Energy Research 
Center) have produced many reports on energy in China and India to identify key drivers of energy and emissions 
trajectories and the role of different policy strategies.   
6 See also Annex Figure A1 and A2, and Annex Table A1 (a and b).   7
At present, China is the second-largest energy consumer in the world following 
the U.S. Its total energy use, however, is still only half that of the U.S., and its per capita 
consumption levels are only about 10 percent of that in the U.S.
7 Because  China's 
population is more than four times the size of the population in the U.S., China's per 
capita energy consumption level has only to double (i.e., increase to 23 percent of the 
U.S. level) for it to become the world's largest consumer of energy. 
 In 1980 China had one of the highest energy intensities
8 in the world using GDP 
at market prices (see table 2) – almost 7 times as high as the US and almost four times as 
high as in India. Using purchasing power parity figures lowers the relationship the US 
from 6.72 to 1.64, but increases it relative to India from 3.8 (6.72 / 1.77) to 5.0 (1.64 / 
0.33). In fact, measured relative to GDP in PPP, China and India both appear more 
efficient than the USA. However, given that most energy use is in tradable / marketed 
sectors and the evidence of continuing inefficiency in industry (World Energy Council, 
1999), it still seems that the scope for and returns to economizing on China’s and India's 
energy use are potentially large.  
Another important aspect of energy intensity in China and India is the change 
over time. In the 23 year period from 1980 to 2003 energy intensity in China declined by 
an extraordinary 4.8 percent per annum
9— more than double the 2 percent per annum 
decline in the US and almost 24 times faster than the anemic 0.2 percent per annum 
decline in India. As a result, China's energy intensity dropped by half relative to the US, 
while India's increased by 50 percent relative to the US. This significant pattern of 
change over more than two decades (both within the two countries, as well as, relative to 
the US) is the same whether one uses GDP at market prices or purchasing power parity 
prices (see last row of table 2). 
 
Table 2: Changes in Energy Intensity in China, India, and the U.S. 
 
     
Based on GDP at market prices 
(constant 2000 US$) 
Based on GDP at purchasing 
power parity prices (PPP) 
(constant 2000 international $) 
      China  India  U.S.    China  India  U.S. 
Energy  Intensity*  1980  101,936 26,805 15,174   24,922  5,051  15,157 
 2003  33,175  25,460  9,521    8,076  4,761  9,561 
Growth Rate  1980-2003  -4.76%  -0.22%  -2.01%  -4.78%  -0.26%  -1.98% 
Relative to U.S.  1980  6.72  1.77   n.a.    1.64  0.33   n.a. 
 2003  3.48  2.67    n.a.   0.84  0.50    n.a. 
Change in Ratio  1980-2003  0.52  1.51   n.a.   0.51  1.49   n.a. 
 
* Total Primary Energy Consumption (Btu) per unit of output 
Note: n.a.= not applicable; PPP =  purchasing power partity 
Source: Adapted from EIA (2003a) and World Bank (2005a). 
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Energy data is taken from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (USEIA) International Energy Annual 2003 
and population data comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2005a). 
8 The amount of energy consumed per unit of economic output. 
9 Most of the reduction in energy intensity in China since 1978 is attributed to technological change, not structural 
shifts from heavy to light industry (Lin, 1996). 
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B. Limited Low-Cost Domestic Energy Resources Other Than Coal for the Production 
of Electricity 
China’s use of electricity more than doubled in the decade between 1986 and 
1995 and then again by 2003 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2005). China has the fastest 
growing electric power industry in the world – fueled primarily by coal. Hydroelectric 
generating capacity is a particularly important source of electric power only in the central 
and western regions. Industry is the largest consumer of electricity, followed by the 
residential sector, and then the agricultural sector.  
India has an installed electricity generation capacity of 112,000 MW which is 
about 10 percent that of the U.S. (Energy Information Administration, 2005a). 
Approximately 70 percent of India’s electricity comes from coal. Unlike China, India 
does not have a large supply of high-quality coal, nor of gas for electricity generation.  So 
more and more high quality coal and gas has to be imported.  Industry is the largest 
consumer of electricity, followed by the agricultural sector and then the residential sector.  
As in the case of China, India’s power sector continues to face a considerable 
demand-supply gap, and the supply it has is of poor quality (low voltage and grid 
instability). Peak shortage in power is estimated in the range of 13 percent (Indian 
Ministry of Power, 2003), even though the peak is probably lower than it would have 
been with more reliable supply. Transmission and distribution (T&D) losses
10 in some 
states (such as Maharashtra) amount to around 40 percent of total electricity generated 
centrally. 
 
C. Strategic/Security Concerns over Growing Oil Imports for Transportation 
In China, deficiencies in existing oil pipeline infrastructure (to link the remote 
hinterland to the primary centers of demand in the rapidly industrializing coastal regions) 
meant that economic agents in these centers found it cheaper to import fuel oil and diesel 
from abroad than to rely on domestic sources of oil and oil products even when the 
country was a net exporter of oil. 
In addition, in the last decade China has committed itself to a strategy of 
emulating the U.S.’s dependence on motorization as the dominant mode of transportation. 
This strategy was only in part determined by mobility considerations. It was primarily 
driven by industrial policy considerations.
11  The automobile industry is seen as a 
                                                 
10 The losses can be of a technical nature (such as line losses due to poor maintenance, overloading, poor standards of 
equipment, low power factors at off peak hours etc.), or of a commercial nature (such as illegal tapping of low tension 
lines, faulty energy meters/unmetered supply, and uneven revenue collection). Some of the problems with loss 
reduction are lack of energy audits, lack of segregation of losses into technical and commercial losses, and lack of 
transparency in meter reading and billing. Available data cited above does not distinguish between the two types of 
losses even though the commercial losses, such as theft, are a loss to the utility but not to the power available for 
consumption. 
11 
The 16th Conference of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the 8th Conference of the 
National People’s Congress established the strategic role of automobile industry as a pillar of its economy. For details, 
see the web site of the Automotive Sub-Council of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, 
http://www.autoccpit.org. 
    9
potential engine of growth for the economy as a whole because of its multiplier effect 
through buyer-supplier linkages. 
This strategy shift has seen less energy-intensive vehicles, such as bicycles and 
pedi-cabs, replaced by more energy-intensive vehicles, such as motorcycles, cars and 
trucks. The rate of growth of the vehicle fleet – which averaged 5.7 percent per annum 
through 1999 – accelerated dramatically to 26.5 percent per annum in the last five years, 
though there are now signs that the growth rate is beginning to moderate. Automobile 
ownership in China is still only eight to ten per thousand people, in contrast to the 
approximately 400 per thousand people in Japan, and the approximately 500 per thousand 
people in the U.S.
12 However, a tenfold growth in ownership of automobiles over the 
next 30 years in China is quite conceivable given the expected growth in household 
incomes and current government policies. The average number of vehicle miles traveled 
per household and the volume of freight transported by truck traffic is also expected to 
expand dramatically: within urban areas, as urban sprawl increases and jobs and 
residences disperse across a larger area, increasing distances between them; and between 
urban centers, as commercial and industrial entities rely increasingly on the flexibility 
provided by the growing highway network (relative to railways) linking China’s cities, 
and connecting the coasts to the hinterlands. The penetration of fuel efficient hybrid 
technology in the vehicle fleet is still very low. 
Some cities in India, such as Delhi, have exhibited similar explosive growth in 
automobile ownership and use as in China. Overall, however, India’s reliance on the road 
sector for passenger and commercial traffic is much lower because it started much later. 
But the recent growth of the middle class in India, and the government's decision to 
dramatically expand the highway network is likely to fuel a growing dependence on the 
road sector. Both China and India have seen, in addition, an explosive growth in air 
traffic – another major consumer of oil products. 
 
1.2 Energy Use and Fossil Fuel Emissions in China and India in the Period 1980–
2004 
China is the largest producer of coal in the world. In 2004, its production was 
almost double that of the U.S. (2.2 billion short tons versus 1.1 billion short tons) (EIA, 
2006). China’s estimated total coal resources are second only to the former Soviet Union 
although proven reserves ranked third in the world. China is a net exporter of coal and 
likely to remain so for at least another decade. 
In 2003, coal accounted for 67 percent of China’s primary energy production of 
1,216 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe), oil for 12 percent, natural gas for 3 percent, 
hydro for 2 percent, and biomass and other waste for 16 percent (table 5.1). China has a 
growing nuclear power sector, but its output accounts for less than one percent (0.8 
percent) of energy production in 2003. More recently, China has moved aggressively to 
expand nuclear, wind and solar power generating capacity, as well as new technologies 
                                                 
12 Vehicle ownership figures in Japan and the United States are higher, at 570 per 1,000 people in Japan and 780 per 
1,000 people in the United States. Vehicle ownership includes not just automobiles but also buses, pickups, and trucks 
– but not motorcycles (World Bank, 2005a).   10
for coal gasification, etc. In final energy consumption coal dominates other energy 
resources, accounting for 72 percent of fossil fuel consumption, and even in primary 
energy consumption it dominates at 58 percent of total. 
In 2003, India’s total primary energy production was estimated at 441 Mtoe, with 
coal accounting for 36 percent of the supply mix, oil for 9 percent, gas for 5 percent, 
hydroelectric power for 1 percent, nuclear for 1 percent, and biomass energy and other 
renewable for 48 percent (table 1).
13 The use of commercial fuels, such as coal and oil, is 
growing rapidly in tandem with economic expansion (industrialization and growing per 
capita income). Nonetheless, unlike China, more than 60 percent of the Indian 
households still depend on traditional energy sources such as fuelwood, dung, and crop 
residue for their energy requirements (TERI, 2004). 
The increasing use of fossil fuels (particularly coal and oil) in both countries is 
also generating harmful emissions – particulates (with primarily local effect on health in 
urban areas), sulfur and nitrogen (with primarily regional effects via ozone and acid rain 
on agriculture and ecosystems), and CO2 (with primarily a global effect via carbon on 
global warming). 
 
A. Global Externalities – China Is on Track to Become the World’s Largest Emitter of 
Greenhouse Gases, with India as the Next Largest Emitter among Developing 
Countries 
Currently the U.S. is the world’s largest emitter of carbon emissions from energy. 
However, China is expected to overtake the U.S. in the next decade plus. China’s carbon 
emissions are driven by the rapid growth in the use of fossil fuels – particularly coal and 
oil (gas not being a significant contributor yet). CO2 emissions from India are a quarter of 
those from China, but also growing due to the dependence on fossil fuels, particularly for 
electricity production. As evident in figure 1, CO2 emissions in both countries track coal 















                                                 
13 30 years earlier, before the major expansion of commercial electricity production, traditional biomass accounted for 
66 percent of India’s total primary energy supply. At that time traditional biomass was also a major source of energy in 
China – approximately 30 percent (IEA 2005a).   11
Figure 1: Primary Energy Use of Coal and Total CO2 Emissions from  




































































































Source: IEA (2005a, b). 
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide; Mtoe = million tons of oil equivalent. 
What socioeconomic factors are driving CO2 emission changes in China and 
India? Recent literature covering the period 1980–96/97
14 has suggested that economic 
growth was the single largest driver of increased emissions in both countries
15. Over time 
the gross emission increases have been significantly offset by improved energy efficiency 
in China, but much less so in India (as noted earlier in the discussion on energy intensity 
in the two countries). Decarbonization, i.e. lowering CO2 emissions by reducing the 
emission factor
16 through use of better technology and expanding the use of fuels with 
lower carbon content, was not a significant factor during this two decade period in either 
country. However, its importance in India has increased in the 1990s. 
 
B. Local Externalities—Growing Public Health Costs from Severe Air Pollution 
(Arising Mainly from Coal Combustion But Also from Vehicular Exhaust) Is Driving 
Domestic Policy Responses 
As noted earlier, not only is heavy reliance on fossil fuel (particularly coal) 
associated with the expansion of CO2, it is also associated with the expansion of various 
types of local pollutants (such as suspended particulate matter, sulfur dioxide SO2, NOx, 
etc.) contributing to health problems, particularly in cities, and ground level ozone
17 and 
acid rain, that particularly affect rural areas and natural ecosystems. 
Sulfur dioxide (SO2) and soot released by coal combustion are the two major air 
pollutants that form acid rain, which now falls on about 30 percent of China's total land 
                                                 
14 For China, see Sinton, Levine, and Wang (1998), Van Vuurena et al (2003), and Zhang (2000). For India, see Paul 
and Bhattacharya (2004).  See also Annex Table A2 and A3. 
15 These articles use different decompositions and techniques and as such are not strictly comparable, even though they 
cover roughly the same time period. Thus, in the India study the “economic” component includes the consequences of 
labor force increases, whereas in the China study it is part of the “population” component. As a result, the studies 
suggest that different variables such as “population growth” in China and “structural changes” in India also increased 
energy emissions. 
16 Emissions per unit energy.  
17 Ozone and other photochemical oxidants are formed by the action of ultra-violet (UV) light from the sun on 
nitrogen. Its production and concentration are dependent on the presence of NOx and ultra-violet light.   12
area (USEIA 2003c)—areas which are also affected by an ozone generated natural haze. 
In India too, acidic precipitation is becoming increasingly common. According to the 
Envioronmental Information System of India, soils in the northeast region, parts of Bihar, 
Orissa, West Bengal and coastal areas in the south already have low pH values. If 
immediate mitigative measures are not taken, further aggravation from acid rain may 
cause these lands to become infertile or unsuitable for agriculture. Studies in India show a 
decrease in mean wheat yield of 13 to 50 percent within 10 kilometers of thermal power 
stations with capacities of 500 to 2000 MW respectively (Mitra and Sharma, 2002). 
Similar studies in China have concluded that the deteriorating air quality has reduced 
optimal yield by 5–30 percent for about 70 percent of the crops grown there (Chameides 
et al, 1999).
18 
Industrial boilers and furnaces based on coal are the largest single point sources 
of urban air pollution
19, and road transport the main mobile source of air pollution. 
Depending on what pollutant one focuses on, a different set of 10–20 cities are amongst 
the most polluted in the world in terms of air pollution. Many Chinese and Indian cities 
are amongst these cities (see figure 2).
20 
FIGURE 2: Air Quality Comparison of Some World Cities, Year 2000 




























































Source: Hao and Wang (2005). 
Note: NO2 = nitrogen dioxide; SO2 = sodium dioxide; TSP = total suspended particulates. 
One can speak meaningfully about pollution in a city, a locality, or a river –
because pollution per unit area is a function of localized air sheds and watersheds. But 
there is no equivalent measure for an area as large as a country – so there is no such 
metric for the average level of pollution in China or India. Instead it is more useful at the 
                                                 
18 Assuming sufficient water and nutrients, simulations of the crop-response models demonstrate that atmospheric 
aerosols lead to lower crop yields through a decrease in total surface solar irradiance—thereby affecting the marginal 
productivity of other inputs. 
19 China’s State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) estimates that “industrial pollution accounts for over 70 
percent of the national total, including 72 percent for sulfur dioxide (SO<->2<->) emissions, and 75 percent for flue dust 
(a major component of suspended particulates)”.     
20 Earlier studies include the report released in 1998 by the World Health Organization (WHO).   13
country level to estimate the total number of people exposed to different levels and types 
of pollution. 
In 2003,  more than half (58.4 percent) of China’s urban population was exposed 
to average annual amounts of PM10 in excess of 100 micrograms per cubic meter, which 
is the Chinese standard (and twice the U.S. standard). Air pollution is estimated to have 
led to damages valued at 394 billion Yuan
21 and 300,000 cases of chronic bronchitis in 
660 Chinese cities in that year (World Bank, 2007). In the case of India, Cohen et al 
(2004) reported an estimate of 107,000 excess deaths in 2000.
22 
Addressing domestic emissions is a major national motivation for taking action. 
Attempts to reduce local emissions in China by curtailing coal production and 
consumption had some success in reducing SO2 and other local emissions  for a few years 
in the late 1990s (Hao and Wang, 2005). Reductions in SO2 tracked the apparent dip in 
coal consumption and CO2 emissions in China (see figure 1 and Annex Figure A3). Even 
though GDP grew by a third (+33.7 percent) in the period 1997–2001, there was almost 
no increase in CO2 emissions (+0.2 percent) – in contrast to a 14 percent increase that 
would have been predicted based on emissions to GDP ratios in the period 1980 to 1997. 
SO2 concentrations (mg/m
3) also dropped by approximately 40%. This drop gave rise to 
much optimism regarding the potential for ‘decoupling’ the growth in emissions and 
energy requirements from the growth of GDP. Several factors – including faulty statistics 
– explain this apparent decoupling. Their relative weight is still being debated. But the 
closing of a large number of small and inefficient coal producers was one important 
factor in this decoupling (Sinton and Fridley, 2000, 2003; Sinton, 2001). 
But this decoupling could not be sustained. With low power tariffs, blackouts, and 
power shortages arising from 9–10 percent per annum GDP growth, it has been necessary 
to use all power generating capacity, no matter how inefficient.  As a result both SO2 
emissions (particularly in northern cities) and CO2 emissions resumed an upward trend. 
 
1.3 Energy Use in China and India and International Energy Markets 
The decision to encourage more reliance on roads for passenger and freight 
movements has resulted in a surge in the demand for oil (gasoline, diesel and other oil 
products) in both China and India. This has resulted in the growth of oil imports with 
national implications for balance of payments and energy security, and global 
implications for world energy markets. This section addresses the latter issue and argues 
that the recent growth in energy use in China and India does account for a significant part 
of the incremental increase in global energy use, but that the annual growth in global 
energy use has not been unusual relative to the past and as such is not the key component 
                                                 
21 With each death costed at 1 million Yuan (Table 4.5, p.74 World Bank 2007). 
22 Other partial studies corroborate these findings. In China, the consequences of current air pollution levels are 
apparent in public health statistics for some cities: “approximately 4,000 people suffer premature death from pollution-
related respiratory illness each year in Chongqing; 4,000 in Beijing; and 1,000 in both Shanghai and Shenyang. If 
current trends persist, Beijing could lose nearly 80,000 people, Chongqing 70,000, and other major cities could suffer 
tens of thousands in cumulative loss of human life through 2020. With industry expected to maintain rapid growth 
during the next 20 years, a steep decline in pollution intensity will be necessary just to keep emissions constant” 
(Dasgupta et al, 1997). In India, Delhi has been identified as the city having the highest mortality figure of about 7,500 
deaths per annum. (Brandon and Hommann, 1995; WHO, 2002; World Bank, 2005a).   14
in the recent surge in oil prices. Rather it is the tightening of oil supplies in the context of 
diminished spare capacity and growing geopolitical uncertainties that is driving the 
increase in oil prices in the last couple of years. 
Since the late 1980s nominal oil prices 
23  have been relatively stable and flat. 
There were two exceptions: a momentary spike (reflecting uncertainty) during the Gulf 
crisis of 1990–91 with prices soaring +50 percent above the average price in the period 
May 1990–91 average; and a longer-lasting perturbation during the Asian crisis of 1997–
98 (when per-barrel prices dropped by some US$12.9 between January 1997 and 
December 1998). The latter reflected a negative demand shock, caused mostly by the 
decline in oil demand in Asia, and the modest slow-down of economic activity in Europe 
and Japan. But the price drop also reflected a lag in the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries’ (OPEC’s) downward adjustment of its production. This drop in 
price was followed during 1999 and 2000 by a symmetrical catch-up in prices under the 
combined effect of successive cuts in production by OPEC and the renewed growth in 
global economic activity. Between 2002 and 2004 oil prices entered a period of gradual 
but sustained increase, and since 2004 oil prices have surged.  The time profile and 
determinants of the recent price trend have nothing in common with the two events in the 
1990s, nor with either of the two former oil shocks in the 1970s
24 (IMF, 2005), which 
were characterized primarily by abrupt geopolitical supply disruptions . 
The more gradual, but steady increase of the oil price in the period 2002-2004 has 
been driven by buoyant growth in global demand in the context of a worldwide economic 
expansion. Global GDP (in constant terms) has exhibited fluctuating but high annual 
growth rates from 2002 to 2004 in the range of 3 percent – 4 percent and only a slight 
slow-down in late 2004 and throughout 2005.
25  Global crude oil use grew from 77.6 
million barrels a day (mbd) to 84.2 mbd between first quarter of 2002 and the last quarter 
of 2004 and despite signs of a slow-down throughout 2005, continued to increase 
compared to 2004 (+1.1 mbd on average), indicating the relative inelasticity of oil use 
with respect to higher prices in the short-run.
26 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are 
responsible for the largest share in crude oil use over this period (relatively steady at ~ 60 
percent). China’s oil use grew from 6.06 percent (1
st quarter of 2002) to 7.87 percent (4
th 
quarter of 2004) of global crude oil use. As such, it is responsible for the highest increase 
in global oil use over its early 2001 level, averaging 0.25 mbd initially then expanding to 
2.1 mbd (equivalent to 37 percent of the global increase). Furthermore, although crude oil 
use in industrialized countries was decreasing slightly, in parallel with a moderate slow 
down of their economic activity in 2001, the Chinese economy’s momentum was large 
enough to offset the decline and generate a net increase in oil use. Since 2005, as the 
world economy began slowing down (and oil use in industrialized countries was 
levelling-off), economic growth in China was still strong enough to sustain some growth 
in oil use. A similar story applies for India, although it offers much less spectacular 
                                                 
23 For the purposes of this section (unless otherwise indicated), oil price is to be understood as crude oil spot price, in 
nominal terms. The (monthly-averaged) arithmetic mean of Dubai, Brent and WTI grades is used. 
24 Average annual prices rose by 250 percent between 1973 and 1974 and by 133 percent between 1978 and 1979, in 
reaction to the abrupt and significant supply restrictions linked to geopolitical events. 
25 Source: World Bank (2006). 
26 Source: IEA, Oil Market Reports.   15
figures. India accounts for only 3–4 percent of global use and 7 percent of the average 
increase in global oil use since early 2001. 
Thus, China and India account for a large portion (40–50 percent) of the 
incremental increase in global oil use (see figure 3), but they still account for only 9–12 
percent of aggregate global oil use. In addition, the recent growth in oil use in China and 
India has been partially offset by the deceleration or drop in the use of oil in traditionally 
oil-dependent countries. As a result, aggregate use of oil has not grown as dramatically in 
the last few years as it did in the 1990s.
27 
Until early 2005, the supply of oil (and draw-down of inventories) has been able 
to more or less keep up with rising demand. But since then, with OPEC spare production 
capacity declining, the market has been under pressure, although this eased somewhat 
toward the end of 2005. All along the supply chain, this tightness has magnified many 
short-term developments and problems that were not concerns in a period of ample 
supplies, and has contributed to high volatility. Figure 4 shows that OPEC’s spare 
production capacity started dropping steadily since mid-2002 bringing the market closer 
to binding constraints on the supply of cheap oil. Since Jan 2004 this spare capacity has 
been below 3 mbd. Rough calculations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
suggest that a level of spare capacity on the order of 5 mbd may help stabilise the market 
by reducing volatility by 50 percent (IMF 2005). With geo-political uncertainties 
associated with output from Iraq, Nigeria, and the República Bolovariana de Venezuela 
(see grey part of the bars in figure 4), and underinvestment (both up and downstream) in 
the supply chain, the extent of the drop in spare capacity is even higher. 
 
FIGURE 3: Increase of Crude Oil Use Relative to First Quarter 2001 (mbd) 














Source: IEA Oil Market Report (various issues). 
Note: mbd = million barrels per day; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
 
Figure 4: OPEC Spare Production Capacity (mbd) 
                                                 
27 During the 1990s, overall crude oil demand increased 1.61 percent annually.; by contrast, from 2000 to 2005, it 
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Source: IEA Oil Market Report (various issues). 
 
This upward movement of prices has not slowed even after OPEC adopted an 
accommodative stance in mid-2004 – to enable OECD commercial crude oil stocks to be 
replenished fully and to ease the potential fear of supply shortages in the context of a 
slowdown of non-OPEC production. Thus, supply and demand equilibrium – as captured 
in the inventory model of the oil market
28 – has ceased to fully predict crude oil prices in 
the last few years (see figure 5 -- with market fluctuations in excess demand, but a steady 
rise in prices). 
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Source: IEA Oil Market Report (various issues), and IEA (2006). 
The dramatic acceleration in oil prices since 2004 arose because supply was much 
more inelastic than it was in the past as a result of the decline in spare capacity combined 
                                                 
28 The so-called inventory model focuses on the dynamics of production, consumption and stock fluctuation, and its 
relationship to inventory movements to explain the evolution of prices of a commodity. In the context of the oil market, 
oil stocks levels (including strategic reserves) in OECD countries have been shown to be highly correlated to oil prices 
(Merino and Ortiz, 2005). The inventory model can be applied to the oil market for short-term forecasting purposes (Ye 
et al., 2005) or for heuristic purposes to disentangle the relative weight of different factors involved in price formation 
(Pindyck, 2001; Merino and Ortiz, 2005). 
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with increased geopolitical uncertainties. It is difficult in this context, to assign a very 
large weight to the impact of the growth of oil use in China and India on international oil 
prices. The acceleration of demand for oil, particularly in China (less so in India), could 
be characterized as a demand shock. But at best it is a shock that is displacing demand 
from other sources in the context of supply constraints. There has not been a major 
acceleration in the global use of crude oil since 2004 even though it has been growing 
steadily since 1995 (see figure 6). 
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Source: IEA Oil Market Report, various issues, Energy Prices and Taxes - Crude Oil Spot Prices (US$/bbl) Vol. 2006 
release 01. 
Prices currently are being formed in a setting increasingly driven by expectations of 
future tightness in the market fuelled by concerns regarding medium-term prospects for 
cheap energy supplies such as: 
-  the slowdown of growth in non-OPEC production (despite high oil prices), which 
is expected to peak in about 5–10 years, 
-  the erosion of (OPEC) spare production capacity noted above, which is already 
under the pressure from increasing social unrest and political developments, and 
-  inadequate spending on exploration and the maintenance of existing oil fields, as 
well as, insufficient spending on appropriate refinery capacities in the context of a 
re-specification of demand, causing an extra pressure on demand for lighter 
products.   18
PART 2 – Simulation of Energy and Emissions Trajectories in China 
and India up to 2050 
Both China and India will have to maintain high GDP growth rates for many 
decades to improve the welfare of their citizens and to generate a steady stream of 
employment to accommodate the growing labor force. This growth will be fuelled by 
energy. Many analysts of energy use in China and India note that China and India’s own 
production of fossil fuel energy is not likely to grow at the same high rate as expected 
consumption of fossil fuel energy. As a result, they are expected to become increasingly 
dependent on energy imports. How dependent will be a function of whether they stay 
with current low cost but polluting energy options, or move aggressively to adopt a new, 
more balanced and diversified energy strategy – which is explored in this section. 
In forecasting energy use in the medium term (up to 5 years) it is common to take 
GDP growth and its underlying structure as exogenously determined, and use an 
econometrically estimated elasticity of energy use with respect to GDP to determine 
likely energy use. This parameter tends to have a value substantially less than unity for 
most high income OECD countries, specially since the 1970s. That is when they started 
shifting to a post-industrial service-based economic structure – in part as a reaction to 
earlier oil price shocks in the 1970s. The value of the parameter is close to or greater than 
unity for most developing countries (Zhang 2000, Liu 2004). In the 1990s, however, the 
value of this parameter had dropped to 0.7–0.8 for India—substantially lower than in the 
1970s. This parameter has been even less stable for economies undergoing substantial 
structural changes, such as in China—where it has varied from under 0.5 to over 1.0.
29 In 
fact, reliance on these extra low numbers for China in the 1990s caused IEA and other 
observers of the China scene to dramatically underestimate energy demand in China in 
the post 2000 period
30 (IEA 2002). Based on more recent economic and energy statistics 
(for 2002–2004), China is again exhibiting developing country patterns of energy demand 
growth with an energy elasticity of GDP greater than one.
31 
To go beyond estimating aggregate energy needs within a five-year period 
requires use of more complicated models. To differentiate growth in different energy 
categories (for example, fossil fuel versus renewables, or subcategories of each) a more 
disaggregated model of the economy is required that provides structural detail on 
differential changes within the energy sector and how it responds to relative prices, 
changes in the technology and productivity of different sectors, etc. This requires a multi-
sectoral simulation model. Many energy simulation models have a 20 to 30 year horizon 
because the underlying capital stock for energy production is long-lasting and long-term 
implications of current investments do not show up in shorter time horizons. Even more 
                                                 
29 As noted earlier, this anomaly of elasticities as low as 0.5 in China has not yet been satisfactorily explained. It 
appears to have resulted from a combination of faulty statistics, improved efficiency associated with new industrial 
technologies plus some structural change/fuel switching (low hanging fruit), and draconian command economy 
measures (closing profitable, employment generating town and village industrial enterprises (TVIEs) that were heavily 
reliant on producing dirty coal).   
30 In IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2002, the projected total primary energy demand in China for 2010 was 1,302 Mtoe, 
whereas actual demand had already reached 1,422 Mtoe by 2003.
 
31 Elasticity of energy consumption averaged 1.47 over the period 2002 -2004, according to National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2005).   19
detailed and longer time horizons are required to analyze the consequence of current 
investments for future emissions. Different fuels have different emissions coefficients 
and fuel switching can significantly affect aggregate emissions even for the same level of 
energy use.  The externalities associated with some energy related emissions are also a 
function of the cumulative emissions – i.e. concentrations of long-lasting pollutants, such 
as CO2, not just annual emissions. This requires models with horizons of at least 50 
years,
32 which is what we use in this section. It is important to note in analyzing the 
results of these models that they are not forecasts, nor probability distributions of likely 
outcomes. Instead, the results are heuristic illustrations of the consequences of selected 
types of actions. The usefulness of the results depends on the appropriateness of the 
models and scenarios selected to analyze a given problem.  
 
2.1 Choice of Simulation Models 
In simulating energy and emissions for individual countries some analysts rely on 
top-down economy wide models, while others rely on bottom-up sectoral / technological 
models. The former models tend to generate a lot of trade-offs because they implicitly 
presume that all sectors are operating at their production frontiers, which is often not the 
case in developing countries. The latter models tend to generate more technical win-win 
opportunities, but do not adequately take into account feedbacks or offsetting effects in 
the rest of the economy/energy system. Because of the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of these two types of approaches, it is increasingly common to use a system of models 
that are soft-linked
33 (i.e. that link top-down economy-wide general equilibrium models 
with bottom-up, partial equilibrium models with more technological and sectoral detail) 
to simulate alternate scenarios for country-specific analysis. 
 Multi-regional global models are used to simultaneously simulate developments 
in large countries, such as China and India, to trace the global consequences of these 
developments for different energy markets as well as global emissions. A number of such 
multiregional global models are available (MERGE
34, MINI-CAM
35, AIM
36, etc.). This 
section uses estimates generated by the IMACLIM-R model at the International Research 
Center for Environment and Development (C.I.R.E.D).
37 
The IMACLIM-R model is a general equilibrium model with sub-sector detail on 
the energy producing sectors (fossil fuels—coal, oil and gas—and non fossil fuels—
nuclear, hydro, biomass and other renewables), the energy transforming sectors (such as 
electricity), and key energy using sectors (such as industry, construction, transportation, 
and the residential sector). All other sectors are collapsed into an aggregate composite 
                                                 
32 Many climate change models operate with five-year increments over a couple of centuries. 
33 Creating a “system of models” where the output of one well calibrated model is fed in as an input into another well 
calibrated model instead of establishing a single set of internally consistent equations in a more comprehensive model 
that is not fully calibrated. 
34 For the Model for Evaluating Regional and Global Effects (MERGE), see Kypreos (2000). 
35 For the Mini Climate Assessment Model (MiniCAM) from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the 
USA, see Edmonds et al (1994, 1995). 
36 For the Asian Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) from the National Institute of Environmental Studies (NIES) in Japan, 
see Morita et al (1994). 
37 For the IMARCLIM-R model from Centre International de Recherche l’Environnement et le Développement 
(C.I.R.E.D) in Paris, see Crassous et al (2006).   20
sector for ease of analysis. Growth is determined partly exogenously determined 
(population, savings), and partly endogenously (endogenous productivity growth, 
variations in the terms of trade, exhaustion of cheap fossil fuel resources, etc.). Each year 
a static Walrasian equilibrium is solved and the structural evolution of the economy is 
endogenized (for example, a scenario in which there is a lot of investment on 
transportation and in which consumers have a strong preference for mobility will 
generate different structural growth over time from a scenario with the opposite 
assumptions). 
Compared with other existing economy-energy models, the IMACLIM-R model 
contains a few advantages: 
(i)  It explicitly incorporates technical information on the demand and supply 
sides of the energy sectors, including end-use efficiency and asymptotes to 
efficiency gains  (often neglected in models using elasticities applied to final 
energy demand) and the ability to simulate “learning by doing” and the 
incorporation of capital stock vintages for long-lasting investments to more 
realistically trace the path of investment and technological adoption. 
(ii)  It ensures consistency between this technical information and the 
characteristics of the economic context, including the prevailing set of relative 
prices.
38 
(iii)  It is based on a modeling compromise between models generating long-term 
optimal trajectories under perfect foresight (which tend to underestimate the 
role of social and technical inertia in economic adjustments) and models 
generating disequilibrium dynamics with a lot of hysterisis
39 and knife-edge 
pathways. IMACLIM-R is a growth model that allows transitional 
disequilibrium. The model has the ability to incorporate shorter-term 
transitional imbalances (due to the interplay of imperfect foresight at a given 
point in time and the inertia in the economic system) and the ability to adapt 
[see point (i)]. But, it also contains all the feedback mechanisms required to 
enable it to structurally recover over the long run, a Solow-like long-term 
pathway resulting from demographic changes, productivity growth, capital 
accumulation, and changes in the terms of trade. As such, long-term growth 
does not depend on inter-temporal optimization with rational expectations;
40 
rather it relies on imperfect foresight about future prices and quantities – 
which is explicitly modelled for investment allocation and technology choices 
in the electricity sector. 
(iv)  It allows international capital flows between regions as a function of the 
divergence between domestic savings and total desired amount of investments 
                                                 
38 The reaction to prices, in IMACLIM-R, is also dependent upon technical information, such as the existence of 
asymptotes in energy efficiency, which is more credible than constant coefficients in the production function, 
especially when prices move over a large range. 
39 A mechanism that generates large losses in terms of cumulative GDP. 
40 Although the model describes behavior in terms of current prices, this does not necessarily signify the absence of 
expectations. First, it is assumed that people react to existing prices as the best available information at the time 
decisions are made. Second, the elasticities which govern these reactions are supposed to mimic real behavior and 
incorporate implicitly a broader set of parameters such as inertia, risk aversion, etc.   21
in each of 9 global regions (with China and India each representing a separate 
region). The model is savings-driven. A region’s (country’s) aggregate 
savings rate is determined exogenously by long-term demographic trends and 
age structure rather than short-term interest rate adjustments. All savings are 
invested. Desired amounts of investment are computed from (imperfectly) 
expected increases in future demand. There is no reason for the two sides to 
be balanced within a region. As a result, a region with excess savings becomes 
a capital exporter, and a region with a deficit of savings to finance its 
investment needs becomes a capital importer. The international pool gathers 
the exports of regions with excess savings and reallocates the money to 
regions with insufficient savings proportional to the total amount of unmet 
domestic investment needs. This scheme mimics a financial market where 
regions with insufficient savings introduce policies / create assets that are 
likely to attract foreign capital from regions with excess savings.
41 
 
2.2 Choice of Scenarios 
A reference or base case designated as the business as usual scenario (BAU) is 
simulated for this paper.
42 For convenience of exposition only the results of this case are 
described in detail. All others are presented summarily and in relation to the BAU. The 
GDP growth rates assumed in the BAU are on average 6.5–7.5 percent per annum in 
China over the next decade or two, and 5–6 percent per annum in India both tapering to 
3% - 4% by 2050. These average growth rates for the future are somewhat lower than 
recent performance because of presumed institutional and technical constraints within the 
economies—resulting in inefficiencies in the allocation of resources and limiting their 
ability to sustain very high growth rates for a prolonged period. However, a variant of the 
BAU is also simulated. Designated as BAU-H, it assumes GDP growth rates 
approximately 1.0–1.5 percentage points higher per annum for both countries (7.5-9.0% 
for China and 7-8% for India over the next decade or two). These more optimistic growth 
rates are based on recent performance and extrapolation of government assumptions for 
upcoming five-year plans. Both the BAU and BAU-H assume continued heavy reliance 
on fossil fuels for the next couple of decades with adverse consequences for local 
emissions (suspended particulates, sulfur, ozone, etc.), as well as global emissions 
(greenhouse gases—particularly CO2). 
The policy-based alternate scenarios (ALT) are designed to explore the extent to 
which a package of policies
43 can result in two potential decouplings: First, decoupling 
energy growth from GDP growth through reduced energy intensity – either as a result of 
increased energy efficiency, and/or a structural shift away from energy-intensive 
manufacturing in economic activity. Second, decoupling emissions growth from energy 
                                                 
41 A region can control the export/ import of capital by maintaining its terms of trade artificially low/high. However 
such a policy can be implemented in the model only through an exogenous assumption (higher net capital exports are 
consistent with lower terms of trade) – i.e. some countries can be modeled as having a fixed pre-determined net export 
of capital.  
42 The base year for the projections is 2001 rather than 2005 as in other models used in this book. The reason is that 
IEA data for country specific energy details (which are used in the IMACLIM-R simulations) are produced with a lag 
of a couple of years and it was important to ensure that the economic parameters and energy details used in the 
simulations were mutually consistent in the base year and tested for a year or two out of sample. 
43 For more information on policy options see Shalizi (2005).   22
growth through fuel switching – i.e. increasing reliance on fuels with fewer carbon 
emissions such as from coal to gas (or clean coal), or from fossil fuels to nuclear energy 
or renewables (and associated simultaneous improvements in energy efficiency). The 
decouplings are not themselves policies nor are they totally independent of each other. 
Rather they are an analytically convenient way of describing the extent to which the 
policies have been effective in increasing the economy's energy efficiency and reducing 
its generation of harmful emissions. 
Three sets of policy scenarios are simulated: 
1.  Demand-side scenarios (designated with a D) that include actions geared 
towards improvement of end-use efficiency/energy saving,
44 over and above the 
energy efficiency improvements already incorporated in the BAU case 
(described later in the KAYA diagrams in Figure 9). The additional 
improvements are (a) a 25 percent improvement in overall energy efficiency in 
the “composite” sector (including both ‘pure efficiency’ and structural change 
in the economy with an increase in the share of services in GDP) relative to the 
base case, (b) an additional 1.1 percent per annum efficiency gain in 
residential/household energy using equipment—leading to an eventual 60 
percent improvement relative to the base case, and (c) a 50 percent 
improvement in the fuel-efficiency of cars by 2050 compared to the base case. 
2.  Supply-side scenarios (designated with an S)
45 that include a higher share of 
hydroelectricity and nuclear power in both India and China than under the BAU 
cases which already incorporate some expansion of non-fossil fuels sectors. The 
additional improvements include (a) a 20 percent increase in hydroelectric 
capacity relative to the base case, and (b) a 30 percent increase in the share of 
nuclear power in new investments for power generation, (c) the share of 
biofuels is progressively increased to 10 percent of the total amount of fuels 
produced by China and India. The shares of wind and solar energy increase 
significantly from a very low base but not enough to offset the reduction in the 
use of traditional biomass. (d) Energy efficiency is also increased by 15 percent 
in the use of coal for industry and by 8 percent in the use of coal for electricity 
generation in the new capital stock installed after 2005. 
3.  Supply and demand side scenarios (designated with an S&D) that combine 
the efficiency improvements and fuel-switching measures above, and are in line 
with Chinese and Indian energy strategies. (Sarma, Margo, and Sachdeva, 1998; 
Liu, 2003). 
The BAU and ALT scenarios are each simulated in two different contexts: (a) the 
base case used for reference purposes (i.e., BAU and BAU-H) which assumes, perhaps 
                                                 
44 The IEA suggests that end use efficiency improvements are the source of the greatest potential in managing energy 
demand and mitigation of CO<->2<-> emissions. Over the 2002–2030 period, improvements in end-use efficiency could 
contribute to more than 50 percent in the reduction in emissions for a group of 11 IEA countries (Australia, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Norway, Sweden, U.K. and U.S.) for which IEA has complete time series data 
(see Bradley, 2006). 
45 Note that fuel switching is often also accompanied by simultaneous improvements in energy efficiency. 
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unrealistically, that there are no constraints to adjusting to short term signals on energy 
markets (i.e., there is no barrier/friction/rigidity that might constrain timely adjustment of 
prices and quantities within China and India, or internationally); and (b) where there are 
constraints to timely adjustment in response to growing energy needs – either (i) on the 
deployment of domestic coal supply in India and China, or (ii) on the evolution of future 
oil and gas markets, due to unexpected geopolitical or resource shocks in the global oil 
markets, or due to difficulties of the world oil and gas industry (including refineries) in 
developing the necessary production capacities in time. This second, perhaps more 
realistic, set of scenarios are designated with the subscript f for friction (i.e., scenarios 
BAU-f and BAU-H-f). 
Whether the energy demand in China or India will put pressure on international 
fossil-fuel energy markets and the price of energy depends upon: 
-  the volume of fossil fuel (particularly oil and gas) imports by China and India – 
which will be determined by the pace and energy structure of their economic 
growth, and by the nature and actual efficiency of their policies and institutional 
capacity to promote domestic energy supplies, 
-  the nature of the overall imbalances in international energy markets, given that 
these imbalances can arise either from the fundamentals of the oil and gas markets 
(such as inadequacy of investment in refining or transporting capacity), or as a 
result of shocks caused by geopolitical tensions. 
These different scenarios generate a series of outcomes that can be compared. The 
particular outcomes of interest in this study are: (i) the energy requirements in the 
economy, (ii) the global emissions associated with these energy requirements (focused on 
CO2), (iii) the local emissions associated with these energy requirements (focused on 
SO2)
46, and (iv) investment requirements associated with the different energy trajectories. 
These simulations also enable us to compare the consequences of accelerated or delayed 
investments in shifting from the base case (BAU) to additional policy actions (ALT) 
scenarios, and explore the potential for self financing versus additional external financing 





2.3 The Reference Scenarios  
A. When There Are No Adjustment Problems in the Energy Sector Internationally 
or in China and India (The “No Friction” Case) – BAU and BAU-H 
 
                                                 
46 The variable total suspended particulates (TSP) which is most often used in health analysis ex post, is difficult to 
project ex ante and therefore not included.  SO2 emissions can be projected with the help of the simulation model and 
are included in the findings. However, it is not possible to assess their health implications because of the problem 
discussed earlier in the section on local externalities.  It requires projecting the spatial distribution of emissions and the 
density of the population exposed in different localities -- which is not possible at the level of aggregation used in 
IMACLIM-R.     24
The two base scenarios reflect the rapid energy and emissions growth associated with fast 
and very fast GDP growth in China and India over the next few decades. These scenarios 
provide the benchmark energy and emissions trajectories against which the costs and 
benefits of additional policy interventions can be discussed in the next section. 
Country implications: 
In China, in terms of key energy using sectors, industry and services account for 
the largest share of final energy use over the study period, increasing for the next two 
decades to over 60 percent before declining to below current shares by 2050. The share of 
residential use also declines from 31 percent to 25 percent, while the share of 
transportation (relying almost exclusively on refined petroleum products) doubles in the 
period to 20 percent (see table 3). In terms of fuels, electricity represents an increasing 
proportion of final energy use – with its share almost tripling. The shares of gas and 
refined petroleum products increase by two percentage points each, and the shares of coal 
and traditional biomass drop substantially. The role of coal in final energy use declines 
as services grow relative to industry, and the role of traditional biomass in final energy 
use diminishes as commercial electricity replaces it. 
Though electricity represents only one-third of final energy use by 2050, the 
heavy reliance on coal (80 percent) for electric power generation at the mid-century 
explains why coal retains a prominent share in China’s energy balance. By 2050, China’s 
reliance on coal for primary energy use still remains high (63 percent in the BAU 
scenario and 65 percent in the BAU-H scenario). Primary energy use (not final energy 
use) determines the extent of polluting emissions. In the BAU scenario, primary energy 
use in China will double in the 20 year period 2001–2020
47 and quadruple by 2050. In the 
higher growth scenario (BAU-H), the increase in CO2 emissions will be somewhat higher 
at 2.5 fold by 2020 and 5.2 fold by 2050.  
In India, final energy demand from industry and services grows from 33 percent 
to 48 percent, and that for transportation from 10 percent to 16 percent. However, final 
energy demand from the residential sector drops from 57 percent to 36 percent (table 3). 
Similar to the Chinese situation, the switch to electricity increases the share of 
coal in primary energy demand from one third in 2001 to almost 58 percent in 2050. 
Coal’s share expands relative to hydropower and traditional biomass. In the BAU 
scenario, there will be a 1.6 fold increase in primary energy demand in India by 2020
48 
and 3.8-fold by 2050. In the BAU-H scenario the increases will be significantly larger: 
2.2 and 7.9 folds by 2020 and 2050 respectively. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Sectoral and Fuel Shares of Energy Consumption in China and India 
                                                 
47 These simulations follow official Chinese government estimates for the 11th five-year plan and beyond. 
48 These simulations follow official Indian government estimates for the 10th five-year plan and beyond.   25
2005 2020 2050 2005 2020 2050
Total Final Consumption (Mtoe) 921.7 1683.2 2685.1 400.3 609.4 1268.1
By sector
   Industry and Services 58.5% 62.2% 54.6% 32.7% 39.3% 48.3%
   Transportation 10.2% 14.4% 20.8% 10.4% 12.3% 16.0%
   Residential Use 31.2% 23.5% 24.6% 56.9% 48.4% 35.7%
By fuel mix
   Coal 38.0% 37.4% 25.5% 11.5% 13.0% 12.0%
   Refined pdcts 25.0% 27.4% 27.8% 27.5% 27.7% 25.7%
   Gas 2.6% 3.4% 4.4% 2.7% 3.0% 3.3%
   Electricity 13.3% 20.3% 35.8% 9.9% 17.3% 37.5%
   Renew & biomass 21.1% 11.5% 6.6% 48.3% 38.9% 21.5%
Total Primary Energy Use (Mtoe) 1223.1 2483.5 4436.5 515.6 845.8 2068.8
   Coal 54.3% 58.9% 62.7% 29.2% 37.8% 57.9%
   Oil 23.1% 22.6% 20.5% 25.0% 22.6% 17.7%
   Natural Gas 2.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.8% 5.3% 4.5%
   Nuclear 0.5% 0.5% 2.4% 0.8% 0.1% 2.1%
   Hydro 3.7% 3.0% 3.1% 3.7% 3.9% 1.9%





Oil prices: At present, China accounts for 6 percent of world oil use; this share 
rises to 11 percent in 2050 in the BAU case. Note that the share of China’s oil 
consumption in total world oil consumption stabilises after 2030 because oil use in other 
developing countries grows faster. In the same period India’s global share increases 
steadily from 3 percent to 5 percent in the BAU case (see Figure 7).
49  
In the base case the model simulations generate (in 2001 dollars) a price of oil in 
2020 of $61.90 (or $62.47 in the BAU-H scenario) which is less than the actual price 
prevailing in 2006
50. However, as noted in the discussion in part 1, the recent run-up in oil 
prices does not reflect a steady state price. Thus, there is a big difference between the 
high value of oil prices during a short period of time and a steady, permanent high value. 
The US$62 per barrel in 2020 (or the US$ 133 per barrel in 2050 shown later in figure 7) 
should therefore be compared with a counterfactual steady state price independent of the 
recently observed short-term volatility. This normal price would probably be in the range 
of US$40–$50 per barrel in 2006 (not US$75 in July 2006).
51 
 By 2050 there is a five-fold increase in crude oil price in the five decade period 
between 2001 and 2050 (from 25 US$/bl to 133 US$/bl in 2001 prices). This is a 
significant increase but it is not outlandish relative to historical experience.
52 It is only 
double current prices of $70-$75/bl. But as noted earlier this may not be a steady-state 
price. So going back further in time, one finds that the price of a barrel of oil in 1970 was 
                                                 
49 China and India’s early 00’s share of global oil use -- at 6 percent and 3 percent respectively -- is substantially less 
than their current share of global energy -- at 12 percent and 5 percent respectively (see first paragraph in section on 
level and composition of energy use). 
50 The conversion ratio from 2001 dollars to 2004 dollars is 1.065 and to 2005 dollars is 1.092. 
51 Oil price formation in IMACLIM does not incorporate a risk-component (which has been shown recently to play a 
major role), so crude oil prices in the short run may be lower than prices observed recently on the oil market. 
52 Nor is it outlandish relative to some other projections. The US Department of energy's projections in its International 
Energy Outlook 2006 includes a high scenario with oil prices reaching $96 a barrel (in 2004 prices) by 2030.   26
only $9.0 in constant 2004 dollars (or $1.8 in nominal prices of 1970).
53 In 2004, before 
the recent spike in oil prices as a result of tightness in the oil market and geopolitical 




Figure 7: China’s and India’s Shares of World Oil Consumption and Trajectory of 
World Oil Prices, BAU and BAU-H Scenarios 
 
                  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on simulation model. 
Note: BAU = business-as-usual scenario; BAU-H = BAU with high growth. 
Is it plausible that alternate fuel technologies will not displace demand for oil at 
such high prices? This question cannot be answered definitively. The growth in oil prices 
by 2050 is driven by the continuing growth in the demand for mobility (particularly road 
and air transportation) all over the world. This generates substantial growth in the use of 
oil for which there will be few substitutes in the near future – unlike in the power sector 
where there are many renewable alternatives to fossil fuels. In simulating the model the 
market penetration of biofuels or hydrogen as alternatives to oil for transport is assumed 
to be limited in the time period under review.
55  With the exception of ethanol from 
sugarcane (and to a lesser extent from corn) all other biofuels are at early stages of 
research and experimentation. Hydrogen and coal liquification are not yet commercially 
viable technologies and may not be so for another decade or two, and it will take another 
couple of decades before the necessary infrastructure can be put into place to allow a 
substantial part of the fleet to be converted to the use of these alternate fuels. Thus, 
                                                 
53 BP (2006). 
54 The 1970 price for Arab light crude was even less at $1.26 in 1970 prices equivalent to $7 in 2005 prices. In 2003, its 
price was $40 or almost six times as much (IEA, 2006). 
55 As noted in the discussion on supply measures implemented in the model biofuel penetration is assumed to reach 10 
percent of fuels in China and India. For the world as a whole the penetration rate is even lower at 3 percent of fuels 
over the next 50 years based on World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2004).    27
relying on knowledge of currently practical or likely to be practical technologies within 
the next two decades the simulation clearly shows that the upward trend in oil prices will 
continue, linked to supply conditions.
56 
Because of the adaptation built into the model, a gradual price increase does not 
generate a significant loss in GDP, whereas a spike in oil prices (Hamilton, 2003), will 
generate significant losses in GDP – at least in the short run, when the economy does not 
have the requisite ability to adjust. Over time the economy returns to its long-run 
trajectory. As noted by Manne (1978), if there is either perfect expectations or 
progressive adaptation over the long run in a world with no erratic shocks, then one 
cannot expect large GDP variations because energy is a small fraction of the economy. 
This is no longer the case when there are shocks and surprises
57. To analyze the behavior 
of IMACLIM-R in response to a spike in oil prices a simulation was run assuming a 
US$35 per barrel increase in world oil prices over two years relative to the long-term 
price trajectory. At the peak, GDP losses reach -3.2 percent in China (-1.6 percent in two 
consecutive years) and -7 percent in India (-3.5 percent in two consecutive years). 
Emissions: In the BAU case CO2 emissions from energy use more than double by 
2020 relative to 2005 and quadruple by 2050 to reach 3.6 giga tones carbon (GtC) in 
China. They almost double by 2020 and quintuple by 2050 to reach 1.6 GtC in India.  
China and India's combined emissions in 2050 will be 44 percent of world emissions in 
that year compared to approximately 20 percent in 2005. SO2 emissions in both countries 
follow trajectories very similar to the CO2 emissions. 
The overall conclusion is that the high growth of energy use in China and India is 
not likely, alone, to cause structural imbalances in international energy markets. The 
main negative outcomes are in terms of local and global (CO2) emissions (and, beyond 
2050 in terms of the acceleration of the exhaustion of overall reserves of conventional 
and non-conventional oil reserves). 
 What happens to these variables when GDP growth rates are higher in India and 
China?  In the BAU-H case China’s share in world oil use increases to 14 percent and 
India’s to 8 percent by 2050. But the price of oil increases only marginally to $62.47 
(relative to $61.90 in the BAU case) by 2020 and to $139.8
58 (relative to $133 in the BAU 
case) by 2050. With the higher GDP growth rates in China and India (BAU-H), the rest 
of the world experiences a 2 percent higher GDP relative to the BAU scenario, induced 
by the faster economic growth in the Asian Giants.  
In the BAU-H scenario global primary energy requirements will be 16 percent 
higher by 2050. Carbon emissions, however, will be 19.8 percent higher. The faster 
growth in carbon emissions relative to primary energy reflects a 5.3 percent increase in 
                                                 
56 Note that this oil price profile already incorporates an increasing role for non-conventional, more expensive 
petroleum sources. 
57 As noted earlier, assuming “no surprise” and “no friction” in the BAU scenarios may not be realistic. However, these 
scenarios provide a useful benchmark against which to evaluate the case in which there are adjustment problems 
(rigidity and friction), so that prices and quantities do not adjust rapidly and smoothly. 
58 In the BAU-H scenario, oil prices are only US$6.8/bl (+5.1 percent) higher than in the BAU scenario in 2050 . The 
reason for this minimal difference is that, by construction of the scenario energy policies are deployed in a timely and 
efficient manner in the coal sector in China and India to meet their growing energy needs. The rise in transportation 
demand for oil is significant but not enough to generate drastic imbalances on the oil market.   28
the carbon content of the world aggregate energy supply because most of the regions in 
the world are not able to avoid a higher use of coal and other fossil fuels to meet their 
higher energy demands. In the higher growth scenario China and India’s CO2 emissions 
in 2020 more than double to (2.2GtC and 0.7GtC respectively), and grow six fold by 
2050 (to 4.9 GtC and 11 fold to 3.2 GtC respectively). Together, India and China will 
account for 60 percent of world total CO2 emissions by 2050. Thus, comparing the BAU 
and BAU-H scenarios leads to the unsurprising result that – in the absence of alternative 
policies to accelerate energy efficiency and decarbonisation –  energy use and CO2 
emissions will be higher, the higher the rate of growth of GDP.  
Because CO2 persists in the atmosphere for very long periods, it is the cumulative 
emissions (i.e. concentrations) not annual emissions that matter
59 – e.g. for purposes of 
analyzing rising temperatures and global warming. It is in analyzing such issues that the 
advantage of using the longer 50 year time horizon becomes apparent. If the analysis 
were restricted only to the period 2020, we would see that the higher GDP growth rates in 
the BAU-H scenarios generate cumulative CO2 emissions that are only 9 percent higher 
in China and 17 percent higher in India relative to the BAU case. But by 2050 the 
differences are dramatic: 22 percent higher in China and 79 percent higher in India (or 34 
percent higher combined) and this with only an average 0.75-1.25 percent per annum 
higher growth rate in GDP over the 50 year period 2001-2050
60.  
 
B. When There Are Rigidities (Frictions) in the Deployment of Coal Capacities in 
China and India, and Oil and Gas Capacity Internationally – BAU-f and BAU-H-f 
This second set of BAU reference simulations (designated with an ‘f’) examine 
whether domestic constraints in China and India on the deployment of coal, and/or 
geopolitical or technical constraints on the international supply of oil affects the 
trajectory of the variables discussed above. 
The constraints on the development of coal and oil are assumed to occur through 
(i) an inability to deploy adequate capacity in time to meet the growing demand—leading 
to capacity shortages, and (ii) an increase in extraction costs (on the order of 20 percent 
plus).
61  These constraints are not transitional (as they were in 2004 in China), but 
structural – in the sense that they slowdown the pace of deployment of new capacity from 
2010 up to 2050. 
Country Implications 
At the country level the results are significant—particularly for India, which is 
more constrained with respect to domestically available fossil fuel resources: GDP losses 
                                                 
59 This is less the case for SO2 emissions or other emissions that dissipate more rapidly over time. 
60 The 1.0 to 1.5 percent higher growth rates (between the BAU and BAU-H scenarios) cited in the section on business 
as usual simulations refer to the first couple of five-year plan periods after 2005. The simulation is frontloaded and the 
growth rates taper off to 3 percent to 4 percent by 2050.  Thus over the 50 year period the compound average growth 
rate (between the BAU and BAU-H scenarios) is only 0.75-1.25 percent. 
61 There are many possible causes for the decrease in investment productivity in the fossil fuel sectors and their relative 
magnitude is very region-dependent (time-lag between exploration investment, discovery and effective production is 
correlated with bad surprises about the ultimate size or quality of resources, the obstacles to exploitation of tar sands 
and shale oils, revision of official reserves, country risk and institutional instability, etc.).   29
increase up to –8 percent by 2030 (relative to the BAU level) and stabilize at this value. 
The effects are much more moderate for China where GDP losses grow to –2 percent of 
the BAU level by 2020 and plateau at –2.5 percent of GDP from 2030 onwards. As a 
result, India's CO2 emissions in 2050 are 6 percent lower than in the no friction case (3 
percent for China), reflecting essentially a contraction of the economic activity while 
(final) energy intensity of GDP and its carbon content remain virtually the same. 
The losses arise from higher domestic energy prices (including the impact of the 
price of coal on power) that propagate throughout the input-output matrix and affect both 
the profitability of energy-intensive sectors and the purchasing power of households. This 
results in a reallocation of investments across sectors (See Annex Box 1). Dynamically, 
the higher prices in the energy sector make it relatively more attractive for new 
investment at the expense of the more productive “composite” sector, which affects 
domestic growth.  In addition, the increase of the oil import bill (due to lower domestic 
supply of coal, and/or higher international oil prices) worsens the terms of trade. 
Global Implications 
The constraints described at the beginning of this section affect international 
energy prices significantly in the BAU-f scenario (see Figure 8): in the 15 years (from 
2010 to 2025) world energy prices – oil and coal – peak at 15 percent above the BAU 
scenario, with coal reaching its peak more gradually than oil. Thereafter prices decline—
a sign that economies are able to adapt to part of the increase—and stabilize prices 
around +5 percent for coal and +15 percent for oil. 
Figure 8: Increase in World Prices for Different Fossil Fuels Energy Resources in 















This in turn affects world GDP – but only marginally (losses reaching –0.1 
percent in 2050). The same happens to total cumulative primary energy demand (-1.0 
percent in the period 2001 to 2050), and total cumulative carbon emissions (-1.4 percent 
over the period). The carbon intensity of both GDP and energy demand decrease, 
primarily because the share of coal and oil in the primary energy mix drops sharply 
relative to other energy sources such as gas, renewables and nuclear.   30
 
2.4 The Policy Intervention Scenarios (ALT-D, ALT-S, ALT-S&D) 
The alternative policy intervention scenarios show that it is possible to increase 
energy efficiency and reduce emissions substantially without significantly compromising 
GDP growth. 
Country Implications 
The ALT (policy-based) scenarios result in a substantial reduction in energy use 
and CO2 emissions
62 in both China and India (table 4). The combined effect of measures 
acting on demand and measures acting on supply is much stronger than the affect of 
either set of measures alone. More importantly, their positive impact on reducing annual 
energy use and emissions generated are significant and increase over time with marginal 
negative impacts on GDP (see Figure A4). 
 
A. Measuring the extent of energy and emissions decoupling from GDP growth 
KAYA diagrams are a convenient way of presenting the time profile of the extent 
to which the two decouplings mentioned earlier have been achieved. The horizontal axis 
shows the extent of improvement in energy intensity in an economy (i.e., energy used per 
unit of output) and is read going from right to left. The vertical axis shows the extent of 
improvement in carbon intensity (decarbonization) in the economy (i.e., carbon emitted 
per unit of energy) and is read going from top to bottom. In the KAYA diagrams 
presented below (see figure 9) the light black lines refer to the BAU and BAU-f scenarios; 
the dashed lines to the scenarios induced by measures acting on demand only ALT-D and 
ALT-D-f; the dash plus dots  lines to the scenarios induced by measures acting on supply 
only ALT-S and ALT-S-f; and the heavy black lines to scenarios induced by combining 
measures acting on supply and demand ALT-S&D and ALT-S&D-f.
63 
                                                 
62 And even more so for SO2 emissions that have local consequences but are not cited in the tables above. 
63 For brevity we do not show the comparable KAYA diagrams for the BAU-H case – because the patterns for each 
country is the same.   31
Table 4: Summary of ALT Scenarios Relative to BAU for China and India, 2005-2050 
 
2005 2020 2050 2005 2020 2050 2005 2020 2050 2005 2020 2050
China Without friction
   No change in policy --  BAU 1.62 4.46 11.75 1223.12 2483.52 4436.51 0.90 1.96 3.61 71.53 119.68 113.28
   Demand -- ALT-D 99.8% 99.4% 100.8% 99.1% 90.3% 78.8% 99.0% 88.7% 76.7% 99.8% 96.7% 76.0%
   Supply - - ALT-S 99.9% 99.5% 99.5% 98.7% 95.8% 98.4% 98.5% 83.1% 79.8% 101.2% 116.3% 121.7%
   Demand & Supply -- ALT-S&D-f 99.7% 98.6% 99.2% 97.8% 86.7% 75.9% 97.6% 72.8% 59.9% 101.0% 114.3% 92.2%
With friction
   No change in policy --  BAU-f 100.0% 98.2% 97.4% 100.0% 97.1% 97.2% 100.0% 96.6% 97.0% 100.0% 94.3% 92.9%
   Demand -- ALT-D-f 99.8% 97.7% 98.6% 99.1% 88.3% 76.9% 99.0% 86.6% 74.8% 101.2% 110.5% 114.7%
   Supply - - ALT-S-f 99.9% 97.5% 97.1% 98.7% 93.5% 95.6% 98.5% 80.5% 76.9% 99.8% 91.2% 72.9%
   Demand & Supply -- ALT-S&D-f 99.7% 96.8% 97.2% 97.8% 84.9% 74.0% 97.6% 71.2% 58.0% 101.0% 108.3% 89.1%
India Without friction
   No change in policy --  BAU 0.61 1.35 4.59 515.61 845.84 2068.79 0.26 0.49 1.56 18.44 36.64 74.13
   Demand -- ALT-D 99.8% 99.4% 100.9% 99.1% 94.1% 84.8% 99.1% 92.8% 82.9% 99.9% 95.2% 84.1%
   Supply - - ALT-S 99.9% 99.8% 101.4% 98.4% 93.8% 99.3% 98.1% 77.3% 76.4% 102.2% 113.4% 124.9%
   Demand & Supply -- ALT-S&D-f 99.7% 99.0% 101.2% 97.5% 88.7% 83.7% 97.2% 71.6% 63.2% 102.1% 110.5% 103.5%
With friction
   No change in policy --  BAU-f 100.0% 96.9% 92.6% 100.0% 98.8% 95.1% 100.0% 97.8% 94.0% 100.0% 98.6% 91.2%
   Demand -- ALT-D-f 99.8% 96.7% 94.8% 99.1% 92.9% 81.1% 99.1% 90.7% 78.7% 102.2% 113.1% 114.6%
   Supply - - ALT-S-f 99.9% 97.7% 93.8% 98.4% 93.2% 95.5% 98.1% 75.6% 72.0% 99.9% 92.9% 77.9%
   Demand & Supply -- ALT-S&D-f 99.7% 97.2% 95.4% 97.5% 88.1% 80.6% 97.2% 70.3% 60.3% 102.1% 109.3% 96.5%
Energy Investment
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Figure 9: KAYA Diagrams of the Extent of Energy and Emission Decoupling in 
China and India in the Case of Final Energy Consumption  
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In the business as usual (BAU) strategy for China and India there is a strong 
reduction in energy intensity built-in to reflect the modernization of industry and 
adoption of new technology. However, carbon intensity increases in both countries – but 
more significantly in India. China shows a slight improvement in carbon intensity, but 
only towards the latter part of the 50 year period under review. 
   33
Relative to the BAU case, ALT-D measures to reduce demand only (by 
increasing energy efficiency) extend the extent to which energy intensity of GDP is 
reduced and ensure that carbon intensity does not grow as much as it does in the business 
as usual cases. But the time profile of the two decouplings is very similar to the BAU 
cases in both China and India. In China, demand-side policies, reduce emissions by 
0.84GtC relative to the 3.6 GtC of emissions in 2050 (a 23 percent reduction). In India 
demand-side policies reduce emissions by 0.27 GtC relative to 1.6 GtC in 2050 (i.e., by 
17 percent). Interestingly measures to only change demand do not lead, at the end of the 
period to an impressive departure from the BAU pathway; this is due to two main factors 
often disregarded in other analysis: first there are technical asymptotes on efficiency 
gains and only additional structural changes of the consumption patterns can trigger 
additional decoupling. Second, increased efficiency is partially offset by a significant 
rebound effect – particularly in transportation (people drive more as cars become more 
energy efficient), which relies almost entirely on fossil fuels. 
  Relative to the BAU case, ALT-S measures to only change supply (i.e., the 
structure of fuels supplied to the economy) do not extend the extent to which energy 
intensity of GDP is reduced (unlike the demand measures) in either China or India. 
However, in the case of China they do significantly alter the time profile and the extent to 
which the carbon intensity is reduced. In the case of India, after an initial shift away from 
carbon, carbon intensity starts increasing once again (unlike China) because the share of 
traditional biomass for household residential use is much higher at the outset of the 
process in India relative to China (48 percent versus 18 percent respectively). Thus, the 
greater shift from traditional biomass to commercial electricity for household residential 
use results in a displacement of less carbon emitting biomass by more carbon emitting 
fossil-fuel based electricity – despite the increased penetration of nuclear and 
nontraditional renewables such as wind and solar energy for the production of power. 
However, in India, supply-side policies bring CO2 emissions down by 30 percent in 
2050(from 1.56GtC to 1.19GtC), which is larger than the 20 percent in China (from 3.6 
GtC in the BAU case to 2.88 GtC). 
Combining demand-reducing measures with fuel-switching measures, ALT-S&D 
results in both a lowering of energy intensity and a lowering of carbon intensity relative 
to either set of measures alone, and quite significantly relative to the business as usual 
case. By 2050 the combined measures reduce energy intensity of GDP by 24 percent in 
China and 17 percent in India, and carbon intensity of energy by 21 percent in China and 
25 percent in India relative to the BAU scenario. 
Global implications 
The repercussions of these ALT policy scenarios on world energy prices are 
mixed. The improvements in fuel efficiency of transport in China and India lower global 
oil prices by a couple of percentage points. The improved efficiency in coal use and the 
substitution towards nuclear and renewable fuels in generating electricity has a more 
significant impact on world coal prices which drop by some 5 percent to 10 percent by   34
2050. This has a positive impact on India which may have to import more coal in the 
future. These effects are more pronounced in the scenarios with rigidity/friction.
64 
The ALT policy scenarios have a much more significant impact on cumulative 
emissions. The effect grows over time and extends beyond 2050. However, even by 2050 
in cumulative terms, demand-side policies in China reduce CO2 emissions by  about 15 
percent (18GtC) and supply-side policies by ~18 percent (21GtC).  The combination of 
supply- and demand-policies reduces emissions by 32 percent (36 GtC) or almost one-
third relative to the 116GtC cumulative CO2 emissions in the baseline scenario. The 
overall impact of policies on CO2 emissions in India is of similar relative magnitude. In 
cumulative terms, demand-side policies in India reduce CO2 emissions by about 12 
percent (4.5GtC) and supply-side policies by about 22 percent (8GtC). The combination 
of supply- and demand- policies reduces emissions by 31 percent (11GtC) or almost one 
third relative to the 37GtC cumulative CO2 emissions in the baseline scenario. 
 
B. Scale of Additional Investment and Financing Requirements to Increase Energy 
Efficiency and Lower Carbon Intensity (ALT scenarios) Relative to the Business as 
Usual Strategy (BAU Scenarios) 
As noted earlier in the section on energy and emissions trajectories of ALT 
scenarios, implementing either demand or supply-side measures reduces energy and 
emissions relative to the BAU case. The measures do not offset each other, so 
implementing both sets of measures reduces energy and emissions substantially more 
than either alone. And this reduction continues throughout the period up to and beyond 
2050. This is not the case for energy investments (see last block of Table 4). 
Implementing measures to only reduce the demand for energy lowers investment 
requirements in all periods relative to the BAU case, whereas measures to only change 
the structure of fuel supply increases investment requirements substantially relative to the 
BAU case. However, combining the two sets of measures results in an intermediate time 
profile of investment requirements which, in aggregate, is higher in the early period
65  and 
lower in the later period relative the BAU case. That is the requirement for additional 
energy investments drop by 2050 (and in the case of China they drop to a level below the 
BAU equivalent). The reason for this is that fuel switching will require a smaller amount 
of investment when demand is lower.
66 
A key point in this analysis is that net capital flows are fixed exogenously. Thus, 
the increases in investment in the energy sector must be financed either by reducing net 
capital outflows or by diverting other domestic investment. Our simulations assume the 
                                                 
64 Note that the differences between ALT/policy scenarios relative to the business as usual reference case are smaller 
than the differences between scenario with rigidity / friction and the corresponding base-case.  
65 By 114 percent in China in 2020 (equivalent to an additional $13 billion in 2001 prices) and 110 percent in India in 
2020 (equivalent to an additional  $4 billion in 2001 prices). 
66 Note: when friction and rigidities are introduced, the aggregate energy investment required in the BAU-f case is also 
lower than in the BAU case because GDP is lower.   35
former for India, which permits its GDP growth relative to BAU, but at the expense of a 
deterioration in net assets—the welfare implications of which the model ignores. For the 
sake of illustration, we make the opposite assumption for China: investment is diverted 
and GDP falls marginally compared with BAU, but asset accumulation proceeds 
unchecked.
67 The moral is that although the need for the extra investment in the ALT runs 
is real, the results given for GDP are very poor indicators of likely welfare consequences. 
The latter depend on the decline in output, on the decline in net assets, and, of course, on 
the benefits of curtailing emissions. 
 
From a country perspective, the higher initial cost of investment of alternatives to 
fossil fuels is a concern (see Figure A5) as it might adversely affect GDP growth rates. 
Therefore the standard response is to delay adopting cutting edge technologies till 
additional technological innovations reduce their costs.
68 Accordingly, another scenario 
was simulated to explore the consequences of delaying interventions. Delaying the 
implementation of policies will save money now but will result in a larger energy sector 
and therefore in higher investment requirements in the future to reach a target emissions 
level by a specified period. However, these higher investment requirements will be more 
affordable because they will represent a lower share of a larger GDP given the 
intervening growth in the economy. This supports the initial intuition regarding the 
economic benefits of delaying interventions.  However, the environmental benefits of 
these policies will show up later and never quite fully catch up with the benefits 
generated by earlier implementation of the policies. Even though both the costs of 
investment and the benefits of emissions reduction are shifted into the future, the net 
present value of the two policies is not the same. There is a price of carbon for which the 
two streams of costs and benefits will be equivalent. As an example, in the scenario with 
rigidities (f), the ALT-S&D-f interventions today are cost effective relative to BAU-f at 
fairly low carbon prices of US$5 per tonne of CO2 (tCO2) in 2020 and US$6.7 per tonne 
of CO2 (tCO2) in 2050 for China -- (and US$7.8 per tCO2 in 2020 and US$10.5 per tCO2 
                                                 
67 The way capital flows are treated in the IMACLIM-R model affects overall policy costs. The model generates results 
'as if' in parallel with decarbonization policies, the government provides incentives so that private savings are 
increasingly invested in the domestic economy instead of being exported (formally fully equivalent alternatives are to 
receive additional foreign aid, or to redirect towards the domestic economy part of the revenues of capital invested 
abroad or part of the income received from migrants abroad). The current simulations rely on the following 
assumptions: (i) decarbonisation implies higher capital costs and higher consumer prices (at least during the transition 
period), (ii) in the case of China, the government maintains high capital outflows, that offset large revenues earned 
from very large exports of goods and services—a policy which is not in effect in India, (iii) the equations on capital 
balance in the model completely determine whether the additional costs of the energy systems will hamper growth or 
not: In the case of China, if capital exports remain high, additional investment in the energy system crowds out 
domestic investment in the other sectors. In the case of India, the need for additional investment is partly fulfilled by 
reducing capital exports, thereby avoiding the crowding-out effect, (iv) as a consequence of these critical assumptions 
on capital flows, (ALT) policies are more “costly” in China than in India. 
To explore this matter a simulation was run in which China exports less capital net (equivalent to receiving 
additional gross capital inflows to offset the same capital exports as in the BAU case). This enables China to allow 
additional domestic savings to flow into the energy sector thereby financing additional energy investments, without 
crowding out other investments, in a manner analogous to India. 
68 In the IMACLIM-R model used for the simulations in this paper, “learning by doing” is built-in, therefore earlier 
investments in novel technologies will accelerate the rate at which one moves down the cost curve thereby reducing the 
aggregate financial burden.    36
in 2050 for India). Discounting with rates up to 8 percent per annum this is equivalent to 
a carbon price today of US$4.3 per tCO2 for China -- (and US$6.7 per tCO2 for India). 
These prices are well below the US$11–12 per tCO2 that actually prevailed in the first 
quarter of 2006 on the project-based segment of the carbon market (Clean Development 
Mechanism – CDM) -- which means there is no reason to delay. Delaying action by a 
decade requires a higher price of carbon today to generate the same returns. This higher 
carbon price, however, is above current market prices, especially for India (US$20/tCO2) 
and therefore not cost-effective. As a result, the cumulative ‘financial cost reducing’ 
benefit of delaying investments does not fully offset the increased cumulative emissions 
cost associated with prolonged reliance on fossil fuels.
69 
Finally, in contrast to the scenarios in the ALT in the BAU reference cases, in the 
BAU-H (high growth rate) variants, enough savings are generated (particularly in China, 
less so in India) to self finance the higher cost of investment in energy efficiency and the 
shift away from carbon based fuels. However, even in the high growth rate scenarios, 
when rigidities in local and global energy markets are introduced into the scenarios, some 
external financing is required if growth rates are not to be adversely affected in China and 
India. This external financing is justified from a global efficiency perspective because – 
in contrast to mature economies in the industrial countries where there is a large capital 
stock or where firms are operating at their production frontiers – the benefit/cost ratio of 
more expensive clean/low carbon energy investments in China and India is higher since 
in these countries there are multiple, joint benefits (local and global emissions 
reductions), and many sectors are currently operating inside their production frontiers. In 
addition, investment costs will be lower for the “new” capital formation taking place now 
in China and India, than for retrofitting “old/aging” capital or prematurely retiring them
70 
whether in China and India, or in industrial countries. 
 
                                                 
69 This paper does not evaluate the extent of international carbon trading that might evolve post Kyoto. 
70 Of course, once fully depreciated, the capital stock in mature economies will also have to be replaced by more energy 
and emissions efficient technologies.   37
Conclusions 
The first half of the paper documents a number of emerging concerns in China and 
India associated with the level and composition of energy used and emissions generated: 
•  Demand for fossil fuel energy is exceeding domestic supply capabilities in 
both countries. 
•  With modernization of the economy and growing per capita income, the 
demand for electricity is growing very rapidly in both countries. There are 
limited low cost domestic energy resources other than coal for the production 
of this electricity. 
•  Strategic/security concerns have emerged over growing oil imports, in 
response to the growing demand for mobility/transportation – particularly 
road transport and aviation. 
•  Growing fossil fuel use for energy is generating harmful emissions with 
global and local consequences:  
o  China is on track to become the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases, with India as the next largest emitter among developing 
countries. 
o  Growing public health costs from severe local air pollution (particulate 
matter, SO2, ground level ozone, and acid rain) are driving domestic 
policy responses. 
This section also reviewed the impact of growing energy demand in China and 
India on international energy markets – focused on oil. The acceleration of the demand 
for oil, particularly in China (less so in India) can be characterized as a demand shock in 
global markets in the context of supply constraints. The impact on oil prices is more 
nuanced. Global use of crude oil has been growing steadily since 1995. The surge in oil 
use in China in the last couple of years has been partially offset by the decline in oil use 
in other countries. Thus, the dramatic acceleration in oil prices since 2004 has not been 
associated with a corresponding acceleration in global oil use, but rather with growing 
concern about supply constraints associated with declining spare capacity in OPEC, 
refining bottlenecks, and geopolitical uncertainties.  
The findings in the second part of the paper regarding some general concerns 
expressed about China and India's growth and reliance on fossil fuel energies can be 
summarized as follows:   38
•  Energy externalities (local, regional and global) are likely to worsen significantly if 
there is no shift in China and India's energy strategy. 
Local and global emissions are in fact higher 
(i)  in the high GDP growth rate scenarios (BAU-H) relative to the low GDP 
growth rate scenarios (BAU); 
(ii)  for the scenarios in which there are adjustment costs (friction) relative to 
the scenarios in which there are no adjustment costs; 
(iii)  for both sets of the BAU scenarios relative to all the corresponding ALT 
scenarios. 
•  Many countries in the developing world (as well as immediate neighbors of China 
and India) worry that high energy demand from China and India will hurt their 
growth via higher prices on international energy markets. 
This proposition is also confirmed, but with a caveat: In some scenarios, and 
for some groups of countries, the ‘growth retarding’ effects of higher energy 
prices are partially or fully offset by the ‘growth stimulating’ effects of the larger 
markets in China and India. 
•  China and India themselves worry that shifting their energy strategy to fuels with 
lower emissions will reduce externalities and the pressure on energy prices in world 
energy markets—but at the expense of growth in China and India. 
To the extent that energy is a complementary input in the production of GDP, 
then any restriction on the use of energy will of necessity affect the rate of growth 
of GDP. Given, however, that there are a lot of inefficiencies in the energy system 
in both China and India, then in principle there is an opportunity to reduce energy 
growth  without adversely affecting GDP growth. Some of the more energy-
efficient options are competitive cost-wise with current inefficient energy options. 
So these are likely to be adopted through standard market forces and incentives 
where there is adequate competition. However, many other energy efficient 
options are more costly and likely to crowd out investments outside the energy 
sector, thereby slowing down growth. This will occur particularly when domestic 
savings and finances are limited. 
To the extent that in China, and to a lesser extent in India, domestic savings 
continues to exceed domestic investment this constraint is less binding, provided 
countries have the option to redeploy savings (that are currently exported) to 
domestic investment into more costly energy-efficient technologies. However, 
transitional difficulties will require external financing and technical assistance. 
Comparing comparable scenarios suggests that (i) the adoption of energy   39
efficiency options, and (ii) the shift to low or no carbon fuels will not cause a 
significant slowdown in the growth rate of China and India. 
•  The cost of a decarbonizing energy strategy will be higher for China and India than a 
fossil fuel based strategy. However, the bulk of additional investment requirements 
(but not all) can be self-financed (i) without additional transfers from developed 
countries, and (ii) without compromising growth in China or India. Growth globally 
may decline a bit but the amount in quantitative terms is likely to be insignificant. 
The magnitude of the overall economic costs of decarbonizing energy strategies 
by comparison with a fossil fuel based development pathway for China and India are very 
sensitive to: 
a- the content of the baseline: (i) the degree of optimism about the domestic 
capacity to develop coal supply fast enough, and (ii) prospects for oil price 
movements in the baseline scenario. 
b- the degree of technical optimism regarding the potential for new demand and 
supply policies. 
c- the macro economic context of the deployment of these strategies, in particular 
policies linked to external capital flows. 
d- the time horizon. 
The general message is that over a long time horizon it is possible to define 
decarbonizing strategies which do not compromise GDP growth in either country. 
However, in all cases transition difficulties are experienced, between a few years and 
several decades. Additional financing is necessary to cope with these transitional 
difficulties, and they may come either from a change in macro-economic policies (less 
capital exports, consistent with higher terms of trade and lower goods exports) or new 
funds provided by new sources of public/external capital, or through a carbon trading 
system. 
 The paper also shows that GDP, energy, and emissions growth rates are lower in the 
scenarios with friction
71 compared to the reference cases. This is true both in the business 
as usual (BAU) and policy alternative (ALT) scenarios. The scenarios with friction are 
probably more realistic than the scenarios without friction.  The benefits of ALT 
scenarios are more significant when there is friction (surprises and adjustment costs) 
than when there is no friction. As a result, because of uncertainties associated with 
adjustment rigidities, the ALT scenarios -- which presume more investment in energy 
                                                 
71  Where there are constraints to timely adjustment – either (i) on the deployment of domestic coal supply in India and 
China, or (ii) on the evolution of future oil and gas markets, due to unexpected geopolitical or resource shocks in the 
global oil markets, or due to difficulties of the world oil and gas industry (including refineries) in developing the 
necessary production capacities in time.   40
and emissions efficiency technology -- will provide an additional dividend in terms of 
energy security. This is particularly important for India, given its greater dependence on 
imports for oil, gas, and high-quality coal. 
 Finally, the paper shows that the high growth of energy use in China and India 
will lead to higher oil prices, but this is not likely in itself to cause structural imbalances 
in international energy markets so long as the price changes are gradual (that is not the 
case with shocks and rigidities). The main negative outcomes are in terms of local and 
global (CO2) emissions (and, beyond 2050 in terms of the accelerated exhaustion of 
reserves of conventional and non-conventional oil). 
Further research is required to link new generation multiregional global models 
with endogenous growth (such as IMACLIM-R) to more disaggregated models currently 
being developed or augmented in China and India. This will provide a richer framework 
to test specific policies tailored to the unique opportunities and constraints in each 
country. It will also allow analysis of equity issues as well as spatial consequences of 
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Source: Energy data from IEA (2005a) and real GDP (constant local currency) data from World Bank (2005a) 
 



























































Source: Energy data from IEA (2005a) and real GDP (constant local currency) data from World Bank (2005a) 
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and Waste  Nuclear Total
1980 316 107 12 5 180 0 620 313 89 12 5 180 0 599 3 18 0 0 0 0 21
1981 315 103 11 6 182 0 616 311 84 11 6 182 0 594 3 19 0 0 0 0 22
1982 332 104 10 6 184 0 636 329 83 10 6 184 0 613 3 20 0 0 0 0 23
1983 352 106 10 7 186 0 661 348 85 10 7 186 0 637 3 21 0 0 0 0 24
1984 387 116 11 7 187 0 708 384 88 11 7 187 0 676 3 29 0 0 0 0 32
1985 405 130 13 8 189 0 744 401 93 13 8 189 0 704 4 37 0 0 0 0 41
1986 423 131 14 8 191 0 767 418 98 14 8 191 0 729 5 33 0 0 0 0 38
1987 454 135 14 9 193 0 805 446 105 14 9 193 0 767 8 31 0 0 0 0 38
1988 488 140 15 9 195 0 847 478 112 15 9 195 0 809 9 28 0 0 0 0 37
1989 495 139 16 10 198 0 857 486 116 16 10 198 0 826 9 22 0 0 0 0 31
1990 545 136 16 11 200 0 908 535 110 16 11 200 0 872 10 26 0 0 0 0 36
1991 535 140 17 11 202 0 906 523 121 17 11 202 0 874 12 19 0 0 0 0 32
1992 555 143 16 11 203 0 929 541 132 16 11 203 0 904 14 11 0 0 0 0 25
1993 588 138 17 13 205 0 961 576 146 17 13 205 0 957 12 -8 0 0 0 0 4
1994 630 144 18 14 205 4 1015 615 145 18 14 205 4 1002 15 -2 0 0 0 0 13
1995 691 149 19 16 206 3 1084 673 158 19 16 206 3 1075 18 -9 0 0 0 0 9
1996 722 158 21 16 207 4 1128 700 172 19 16 207 4 1119 22 -14 1 0 0 0 9
1997 707 156 21 17 208 4 1113 685 191 19 17 208 4 1124 22 -35 2 0 0 0 -11
1998 698 156 24 18 209 4 1109 678 188 22 18 209 4 1119 20 -31 2 0 0 0 -9
1999 685 161 26 18 213 4 1106 661 205 24 18 213 4 1124 23 -43 2 0 0 0 -18
2000 698 151 28 19 214 4 1115 664 222 26 19 214 4 1149 35 -71 2 0 0 0 -34
2001 705 161 31 24 216 5 1142 648 227 29 24 216 5 1149 57 -66 2 0 0 0 -6
2002 765 168 34 25 217 7 1216 716 244 32 25 217 7 1241 49 -76 2 0 0 0 -25
2003 917 169 36 24 219 11 1377 862 270 35 24 219 11 1422 55 -101 1 0 0 0 -45














and Waste  Nuclear Total
1980 50 11 1 4 148 1 215 53 34 1 4 148 1 241 -3 -23 0 0 0 0 -26
1981 56 17 2 4 151 1 230 60 36 2 4 151 1 253 -3 -20 0 0 0 0 -23
1982 58 22 2 4 154 1 241 62 39 2 4 154 1 261 -4 -17 0 0 0 0 -20
1983 63 27 3 4 156 1 254 66 40 3 4 156 1 271 -3 -13 0 0 0 0 -16
1984 68 30 3 5 160 1 266 71 42 3 5 160 1 281 -3 -12 0 0 0 0 -15
1985 71 31 4 4 162 1 274 76 48 4 4 162 1 296 -4 -17 0 0 0 0 -21
1986 77 32 5 5 165 1 285 80 48 5 5 165 1 305 -4 -16 0 0 0 0 -20
1987 82 32 6 4 169 1 294 86 50 6 4 169 1 317 -5 -18 0 0 0 0 -23
1988 89 34 7 5 171 2 307 94 55 7 5 171 2 334 -5 -22 0 0 0 0 -27
1989 92 36 9 5 173 1 316 97 60 9 5 173 1 346 -6 -24 0 0 0 0 -29
1990 97 35 10 6 176 2 326 104 63 10 6 176 2 360 -7 -27 0 0 0 0 -34
1991 106 34 11 6 180 1 338 112 65 11 6 180 1 375 -6 -31 0 0 0 0 -37
1992 111 30 13 6 182 2 344 118 68 13 6 182 2 388 -7 -38 0 0 0 0 -45
1993 115 30 13 6 185 1 351 123 70 13 6 185 1 398 -7 -40 0 0 0 0 -47
1994 118 36 13 7 187 1 362 127 74 13 7 187 1 410 -9 -39 0 0 0 0 -48
1995 124 39 17 6 189 2 377 134 84 17 6 189 2 432 -10 -45 0 0 0 0 -55
1996 131 37 18 6 190 2 384 142 89 18 6 190 2 447 -11 -52 0 0 0 0 -63
1997 134 38 20 6 193 3 394 147 94 20 6 193 3 463 -14 -56 0 0 0 0 -69
1998 131 37 21 7 195 3 395 144 101 21 7 195 3 472 -13 -64 0 0 0 0 -77
1999 138 37 20 7 198 3 404 152 113 20 7 198 3 494 -15 -75 0 0 0 0 -90
2000 143 37 21 6 202 4 414 159 114 21 6 202 4 506 -15 -77 0 0 0 0 -93
2001 148 37 21 6 205 5 422 162 115 21 6 205 5 514 -14 -78 0 0 0 0 -92
2002 151 38 23 6 208 5 431 168 119 23 6 208 5 527 -16 -80 0 0 0 0 -97
2003 157 39 23 6 211 5 441 173 124 23 6 211 5 542 -15 -85 0 0 0 0 -100
Net Export (Mtoe) Production and Stock Change (Mtoe) Consumption (Mtoe)
 
 
Source: IEA Energy Balances f Non-OECD Member Countries - Extended Balances Vol. 2005 release 01 
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Sources: Sinton et al. (1998), Van Vuurena et al (2003) and Zhang(2000) 
 





1980      
– 85 
1985   
– 90 
1990   
– 96 
1980   
– 96 
Total (net)  133.72 179.01 270.32 583.04 
Economic (G) – due to expansion of GDP  97.38 168.07  259.64  511.11 
Structural (S) – due to sectoral shifts in GDP  27.08 28.85 31.94 92.68 
Intensity (I) – due to changing energy intensity per unit of output  -3.05 -13.98 9.01 -13.18 
Emission (E) – due to changing emissions coefficient per unit of energy  12.96 -3.93 -30.26 -7.58 
 
Source: Paul and Bhattacharya (2004) 
 

















































Source: Hao and Wang (2005) 
 
                                                 
72 CO2 emissions are treated as the product of four variables: emissions coefficient per unit of energy (E), energy 
intensity per unit of output in different sectors (I), the share of the different sectors in GDP (S), and the scale of 
economic activities in all sectors (G). Applying this approach, changes in CO2 emission in a given period can be 
decomposed into effects of changes in the four factors.  
Total (net) change in CO2 emissions (MtC)  488.65 
   Due to economic growth  799.13 
   Due to population expansion  128.39 
   Due to change in energy intensity  -432.32 
   Due to change in fossil fuel carbon intensity  3.93 
   Due to penetration of carbon free fuel  -10.48   45
 
Box 1: How do higher prices arising from rigidities and friction affect the Chinese and 
Indian economies and the world economy? 
 
The basic mechanisms at play in the short term transmission of energy difficulties 
in China and India are shown in the Diagram 1 below.  
First, domestically, higher energy prices adversely affect household purchasing 
power with a deflating impact on the economy (dynamically, the higher prices in the 
energy sector make it relatively more attractive at the expense of the more productive 
composite sector, thereby affecting domestic growth).  
Second, internationally, the increase of the oil import bill (due to lower domestic 
supply of coal or nuclear energy, and/or higher international oil prices) worsens terms of 
trade. This lowers the activity losses in China and India, but transfers part of the impact 





Increase in crude oil price
Increase in crude oil and oil products imports
Trade Imbalance 
Change in terms of trade
Increase in composite 
good exports
Lower growth of 
sector’s value-added





final consumption of 
Composite good







A lower growth rate is induced in most world regions through two channels: 
smaller total world market and change in terms of trade. In the scenario without frictions, 
the resulting overall impact of higher growth rates in China and India on other regions is 
roughly neutral, because the costs of higher oil prices for oil importing countries is 
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Figure A4: Impact of Rigidity/Friction and Policy Alternatives on GDP Trajectories 
        China                  India 
 
Comparison of scenarios with rigidities/frictions in the fossil fuel markets BAU-f  relative 































































Comparison of ALT policy scenarios vs normalized BAU (in the case without rigidities in 





























































Comparison of ALT-f  policy scenarios vs normalized BAU-f ( in the case with rigidities 
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Figure A5: Impact of Rigidity/Frictions and Policy alternatives on Energy 
Investment Trajectories 
 
        China                  India 
 
Comparison of scenarios with rigidities/frictions  in the fossil fuel markets BAU-f relative 























































































































Comparison of ALT policy scenarios vs normalized BAU (in the case without rigidities in 



























































































































Comparison of ALT policy scenarios vs normalized BAU (in the case without rigidities in 
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